The
Rational Argumentator
Does the World Need Nuclear Weapons?
How and why did the humans produce such a destructive force, and how must we deal with its presence today? Nuclear weapons arrived in the middle of the 20th century as a product of the unnatural reaction— the split-up of the smallest known structural particle—the atom. Maybe nature created atoms so that they never split by themselves because the consequences of that event can be as much beneficial to humans, in the form of energy used in industry, as they could be devastating, in the case when the enormous energy unleashed is directed towards destroying the world. However, for many years after the first and only two-stage nuclear attack, the weapons of mass destruction seemed to sustain peace in the world. Two factors promoted to it, common sense suggested that the consequences of the nuclear exchange would be deadly. Secondly, the Just War theory told that usage of nuclear weapons would be considered a disproportionate use of force in any possible scenario; and even if the usage would not lead to the complete annihilation of the humanity it would set a precedent allowing for future nuclear conflicts. Yet, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nuclear Deterrence policy has lost its relevance in preventing the unjust, nuclear wars from happening. Without practicing disarmament and the non-proliferation policies, large quantities of the existing nuclear weapons and nuclear waste that are left would be vulnerable to mishandling, which will have negative consequences. In addition, continual striving to develop and to test nuclear weapons, in particular those related to defensive needs, by both the ‘nuclear and non-nuclear states’, is unnecessary, and it would present a health hazard that would endanger people’s lives and natural surroundings. Still even more importantly, ignoring the international policies would provoke other nations to disobey the laws and would lead to new arms races. Hence, maximum possible disarmament of the ‘nuclear nations’ and successful implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation initiatives will help save the world from the nuclear Armageddon and provide for justice in any future armed conflicts.
The first important step towards a safe future is to realize that, after the collapse of the USSR, the deterrence policy becomes irrelevant, as it is incapable of controlling the spread and usage of weapons of mass destruction. First of all, it is necessary to exactly identify what the policy of nuclear deterrence was. Immediately after the U.S. dropped two nuclear bombs on two Japanese cities, the world realized the tremendous power of the new weapons that made the United States an uncontested superpower. Yet, it did not take long for the archrival of America on the international arena, the Soviet Union, to develop its own atomic and later hydrogen bombs. Since that time the U.S. and the USSR continuously built up their arsenals, but not as a means of war to be used, but as the weapons to prevent a war from happening. Siracusa and Coleman in their article, “Scaling the Nuclear Ladder,” quote early Cold War defense intellectual Bernard Brodie, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”(277) Brodie ruled out possible usage of the nuclear weapons, as they would have brought mutual destruction to both enemies.
Today, after the Cold War is over, many point out that deterrence did not let the war start and must be still practiced; however, I believe that governments need to drastic political changes and enact new policies. Firstly, some people argue that the deterrence or the MAD policy would not have worked even during the Cold War era. Schell in his book, The Gift of Time, interviewed one of the officers, who was directly responsible for control over the nuclear missiles during the Cold War. This officer, Bruce Blair, tells that the U.S. weapons of mass destruction were too vulnerable at the time, and if the Soviets were to launch an attack there would not be enough time for command to order even a single retaliatory strike; the same must have been true about the Soviet Union’s military command. (Schell, 73)
Today the U.S. and Russia are not archrivals anymore; they do not fight an ideological war that could lead to a military conflict. Consequently, since there is no conflict, we can conclude that the U.S. and Russia must get rid of the weapons needed to deter a war between the two nations. The rest of the nuclear club nations seem to be in the same coalition with the U.S., except for India and Pakistan. However, the U.S. and its allies possess large numbers of conventional forces, which allows them to have an advantage over the other nations; in this situation, having the nuclear arsenal in addition to the conventional weapons creates an imbalance of power. Further, this imbalance can lead to the attempts, like that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or of the other nations that inherently oppose the U.S. and its policies, to recreate this balance of power or even to gain an advantage. Therefore, nuclear weapons in this situation would destabilize international relations rather than deter possible conflicts.
Moreover, the weapons of mass destruction, even if nations do not intend to use them, can cause serious problems to their holders, as the weapons can be mishandled in several ways. First of all, the weapons can be hazardous to the health of people working with them, as well as to the environment and the rest of population of the ‘nuclear states’. Damage has been happening in the U.S. since the nuclear industry was introduced. For example, Michael Blain in his article “Rhetorical Practice in an Anti-Nuclear Campaign” asserts that the Department of Energy has been covering up negative statistics dealing with the health of the employees of nuclear laboratories. (362) Further, Blain gives figures that show that, “Surveys reveal abnormally high cancer incidence and mortality rates among the 600,000 people who have worked in weapons facilities since the 1940’s.” Better yet, Blain reports that, “Recent study of 4,000 Fernald workers showed a high correlation between… fatal lung disease and uranium dust.”(362) Likewise, Kathleen C. Bailey and Robert B. Barker in the article “Why the United States Should Unsign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing” point out that safety of the existing nuclear warheads is a significant issue worth addressing by the U.S. “Only one of the eight warhead types in the enduring stockpile has been fitted with all of the six major types of safety measures,” claim Bailey and Barker. (132) Some of the basic safety issues seem not to be met; for instance, in the table that the authors present to illustrate their findings only two types of warheads adhere to the principle of Detonator Safing, which leads one to think that the other six types of warheads can explode unexpectedly. The effects of such an explosion might not resemble the immediate effects of the directed nuclear attack; yet, the emitted radiation can produce some unwanted long-term consequences. For example, in the Ukraine and Eastern Europe, hospitals still report very high rates of cancer and birth defects among the population that became victims of the explosion of the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant that happened on April 26, 1986.
Unfortunately, the existence of the nuclear weapons in large quantities is not only a good recipe for a bouquet of diseases related to radiation but also attracts spies and terrorists, who try to obtain nuclear materials or to carry out a terrorist act. The terrorists cannot make a nuclear bomb unless they have uranium or enriched plutonium that are abundantly present as the materials contained in the huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Thus, to disarm gradually, controlling the safety of the nuclear wastes, means to deprive the terrorists of the ability to create a ‘dirty bomb’. Wolfgang Panofsky in the article called “Nuclear Proliferation Risks, New and Old” contends that, “The first line of defense against nuclear terrorism must be safeguarding the vast worldwide stockpiles of nuclear weapons-usable materials,”; to show that despite the governments’ efforts smuggling still occurs Panofsky states, “According to public sources, small shipments containing a total of roughly 40 kilograms of smuggled nuclear explosive material have been seized worldwide between 1992 and 2002.”(74) Unfortunately, most of those materials were not under the direct U.S. control as they were smuggled from Russia; however, the United States is not protected against that threat, too. Just like the terrorists gained control over the airplanes during the September 11 attack, criminals may attempt and succeed in stealing radioactive materials. Moreover, if the act of terror is their goal, they will try to explode already existing warheads; as we have seen in the previous paragraph the existing weapons are far from being safely stored. Strictest possible control of what the ‘nuclear nations’ already have and of what they are trying to get rid of is an essential part in the struggle against nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, the employees that are to perform any tasks concerned with nuclear weapons and disarmament, though chosen carefully, can be double agents, too. For instance, Graham Allison in “How to Stop Nuclear Terror” asserts that scientists, in particular in Russia, get caught smuggling rather often. In many cases they are high officials like Alexander Tyulyakov, the head of a major organization concerned with atomic energy—the Atomflot; he was caught trying to sell nuclear materials to strangers. (66) In the most recent case, the world discovered that the chief of Pakistan’s nuclear program was selling nuclear secrets and materials to the ‘non-nuclear nations’.
Apparently, the U.S. not only does not gain any profits by selling anyone its nuclear secrets but it continually wastes its resources on the development of the nuclear weapons, in particular, the defensive anti-missile systems. Some may argue, however, that to fight off the threat of terrorism the U.S needs to develop more weapons of mass destruction, as they assure population, the government and other countries of superiority of the United States in the international politics. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rusmfeld, and the Pentagon seem to support the idea of continual arms buildup in the foreword to their “Nuclear Posture Review Report.” Though Rumsfeld stresses several times that they intend to introduce new conventional weapons to substitute for a declining number of the weapons of mass destruction, he still thinks that nuclear weapons should be ready in case of a conflict, “[I]ntercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers and nuclear weapons will…continue to play a vital role.”(paragraph 10)
Despite the continual development of the anti-ballistic missiles systems, many physicists have pointed out that none of the existent defense systems would be able to protect the United States against a massive nuclear attack. For example, Russian physicist Sakharov claimed that the defense systems would not be able to survive a serious thermonuclear attack, says Sakharov’s friend and colleague Sidney D. Drell in his article “Andrei Sakharov and the Nuclear Danger”. Drell quotes Sakharov, “[I]n a thermonuclear war the first blow may be the decisive one and render null and void years of work and billions spent on creation of antimissile system.” (38) American colleagues seem to support Sakharov’s view as Elaine Landau writes in her book The Nuclear Reality, “The proposed revamped system would not be a suitable defense against…a nation with a substantial nuclear arsenal….”(102) The only state capable of launching such an attack today is Russia. Yet, at the present moment Russia and the U.S. do not have any conflicts that could lead them to use nuclear force; in addition, the Russians are too preoccupied with their own war in Chechnya and perpetual economic struggles. If the terrorists were to attack America with nuclear weapons, they would most likely endeavor to bring in the weapons since they do not possess any other alternative capabilities. On the other hand, a mini bomb can be easily made and brought into the United States; Landau tells that physicist Luis Alvarez claimed that if one is armed with certain amount of uranium it is quite easy to make a little bomb that would not have a famous ‘mushroom cloud’ effect but would still be devastating. (Landau, 93) It would make more sense to make airport and other controls stricter, which will reduce a chance of bringing the weapons in, but will not eliminate the possibility nevertheless. Allison says, “Of the seven million cargo containers that will arrive at U.S. ports this year…only two percent will be opened for inspection,” asserting that it would not be hard to conceal a radioactive bomb. Instead of spending billions of dollars on the useless antimissile defenses against the terrorist threat, maybe the U.S. should consider investing that money into advanced airport control.
One of the reasons for prohibition of the nuclear testing is that it produces negative effects on the environment and on the living species. In the meantime, besides developing defensive systems, many proponents of the spread of nuclear force suggest that the U.S should exit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and start new testing. Two major aims of such testing would be securing the safety of the existing nuclear stockpile and developing new modern warheads. The major reason to ensure safety is to prevent unauthorized use of the weapons, claim K.C. Bailey and R.B. Barker. (132) Along with that, the authors of the article emphasize that reliability of the old warheads in a case of attack is not certain. (133) The second major reason why the U.S. should not obey the CTBT is that, “Nuclear testing is required to develop new U.S. nuclear weapons designed for deterrence in the 21st century. The large “silo busters” of the Cold War are not appropriate for the threats of today.”(134) Lastly, Bailey and Barker state that it is easy to cheat and to conduct nuclear testing that would be noticed by the international society; however, it would be hard to find out who conducted the testing. (135)
Maybe it would be easy to conceal the identity of the nation that conducted the test; yet, the circle of the ‘nuclear nations’ is rather limited, and a nation that carries out a test would have to be acquainted with the norms for safe concealment, which are only supposed to be known by the ‘nuclear states’. Let alone the fact of concealment, the environmental effects of the worldwide testing could be disastrous if any nation that wants to improve their weapons or to create new ones will start emitting radioactive materials into the atmosphere. For example, during World War Two, the U.S. military tested its bombs on the islands of the Pacific in the presence of large group of ordinary soldiers. Many of them later reported signs of radiation disease and developed cancer; in addition, those soldiers claimed that they were never informed about the type of testing that took place or about the negative effects on their health. Studs Terkel, for example, in his book The Good War, interviews many people pertinent to the dropping of the bombs on Japan. One of the people he interviews is John Smitherman, a veteran of the U.S. Navy, who was present during the tests of the bombs in summer of 1945; Smitherman says that the soldiers were not informed about any danger, did not wear any protective clothing, and, soon after the explosion, were sent off to extinguish the fire caused by the nuclear bomb (Terkel, 547-548) To prove the deadliness of the outcome Terkel informs us that Smitherman was a president of the National Association of Atomic Veterans and that twenty seven thousand of the forty five thousand members of that organization have passed away; Smitherman himself died in 1983 of cancer, which was supposedly caused by the radiation.( Terkel, 546) However, the immediate witnesses of the tests are not the only possible victims. Sidney D. Drell tells us that Sakharov strongly opposed nuclear testing because, “[O]f the potential effect of the radioactive fallout on the health of people—particularly children—by means of accumulation through the food chain.”(40) Another idea that Sakharov spoke about and which many of his American colleagues share suggests that the testing of nuclear weapons can be done without using radioactive materials. One can simulate the entire process that takes place in a weapon, but in the end one must substitute radioactive material with any passive chemical. (Drell, 40) Bailey and Barker recognize that fact in their paper, too, but they do not support that idea. Even if the existing nuclear stockpiles presented some danger, it seems to me that it would be the same type of danger as exists in the U.S., Russia, or any other countries that possess old models of nuclear warheads. Then the alternative would be to conduct international nuclear testing, certainly approved by the United Nations and NATO, and to share the results with all the nations that need to ensure the safety of their stockpiles. Nonetheless, the U.S. may not like that alternative because its major reason to conduct the testing is to create new highly effective nuclear weapons.
Continual development of new weapons of mass destruction breaks the Nuclear Non Proliferation agreement, the desire to test contradicts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and in general, negligence towards the laws on the part of the U.S. provokes other nations to disobey the nuclear treaties, which will result in further proliferation and arms races. The U.S., a leading nuclear power in the world, does not follow the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the CTBT and the Non Proliferation treaty, notwithstanding the fact, that it also possesses the largest mass of conventional military forces. It seems reassuring to millions of Americans; but if one looks at the perspective that other nations get, it may seem that the U.S. plans on dictating the world and practicing the Big Stick policy. Other nations feel a substantiated need to proliferate nuclear weapons in order to restore the balance of power in the world. For example, James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen in the article “How to Deal With North Korea” underscore that U.S. aggressive policies provide a main motivation for Pyongyang to develop the weapons of mass destruction. “Whether motivated by fear, honor, or aggression…Pyongyang views a nuclear program as its sovereign right—and a necessity.” (Laney and Shaplen, 20) In addition, there is a double standard in the world towards different nations developing nuclear weapons. David Krieger and David Chaffee in the article “Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Regime” reveal that, “While nuclear weapons states have put increased pressure on countries such as Iraq and Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, Israel has never faced significant consequences for having a nuclear arsenal…”(9) Thus, one can see that the U.S. does not fight for global non proliferation and does not mind its friendly states having nuclear weapons; this is another signal for the nations that do not support the United States to seek alternative ways of having any power in international decision making. Lastly, aggressive policies pursued by the U.S. and the claimed need to build up nuclear weapons for better protection set a precedent to other nations like India and Pakistan to develop their weapons of mass destruction and maybe even to use them against each other in a nuclear war. (8)
Indeed, the U.S. possesses the dominant conventional forces machine, and it does not need to develop nuclear weapons because all the states hostile to America nowadays are much smaller if not in size then in power. In turn, continual disarmament on the part of the U.S, Russia and other ‘nuclear nations’ as well as non proliferation of the ‘non-nuclear’ states would assure absence of the arms races, which will lessen general tension on the international arena. Great physicist Albert Einstein once said: “You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war,” this phrase reflects the major idea of my argument. (Quoted, Thro Taking a Stand Against Nuclear War) Ironically, weapons of mass destruction, which cause enormous calamities if applied, for decades were being developed as the instruments of peace. However, a very thin thread supports that peace. Humans as well as robots make mistakes; thus, relying on the operators of the missile systems is worse than destroying the systems that can bring about a complete annihilation upon the world. Certainly, a very high degree trust needs to be developed between both ‘nuclear’ and ‘non-nuclear’ nations in order to continue irrevocable nuclear disarmament. Yet, the U.S. and Russia, countries that are mostly responsible for the creation and build up of weapons of mass destruction, must take the initiatives in their hands and by successful continual disarmament set a positive precedent to the other nations telling them: “We do not need nuclear weapons to resolve our problems and to advance our international interests!” Indeed, the world does not need weapons powerful enough to destroy the Earth a hundred times. Of course, nuclear disarmament would be a very long process since the radioactive materials remain dangerous for hundreds of years before they deteriorate. However, the ‘nuclear nations’ must resolve to disarm firmly, the sooner they do that the sooner they can start counting the days till the last weapon will become ineffective. Meanwhile, we can provide for safety of remnants of nuclear warheads by using them in a peaceful way—creating energy. Without doubt, in many centuries that are to come our descendants would look back on our age and thank smart politicians for resolving to get rid of the nuclear weapons; however, if these politicians do not resolve to destroy the nuclear weapons there could be no centuries and no descendants ahead of us.
Works Cited
Allison, Graham. “How to Stop Nuclear Terror.” Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2004 vol.83, issue 1: 64-75
Bailey, Kathleen C.; Barker, Robert B. “Why the United States Should Unsign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing.” Comparative Strategy 2003 vol. 22: 131-138
Blain, Michael “Rhetorical Practice in an Anti-Nuclear Weapons Campaign.” Peace&Change. October 1991 vol. 16, No. 4: 355-378
Drell, Sidney D. “Andrei Sakharov and the Nuclear Danger.” Physics Today.
May 2000 vol. 53, issue 5: 37-42
Krieger, David; Chaffee, Devon. “Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” Humanist. Sep/Oct 2003 vol. 63, issue 5: 7-10
Landau, Elaine. The Nuclear Reality Brookfield: Twenty-First Century Books, 2000.
Laney, James T.; Shaplen, Jason T. “How to Deal With North Korea.” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2003, Vol. 82 Issue 2: 16-30
Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H. “Nuclear Proliferation Risks New and Old.” Issues in Science&Technology. Summer 2003 vol. 19, issue 4: 73-76
Rusmfeld, Donald. “Nuclear Posture Review (Foreword).” Pentagon. 9 January 2002. <http: //www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/01/npr-foreword.html>
Schell, Jonathan. The Gift of Time. New-York: Metropolitan Books, 1998.
Siracusa, Joseph M.; Coleman, David G. “Scaling the Nuclear Ladder: Deterrence from Truman To Clinton.” Australian Journal of International Affairs Nov. 2000 vol. 54, issue 3: 277-297
Terkel, Studs. The Good War. New York: The New Press, 1990
Thro, Ellen. Taking a Stand Against Nuclear War. New York: Franklin Watts, 1990
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