I fully agree with Mr. Stolyarov's characterization of Hamas, and in general his point that the Israelis are pressured to retrain themselves is correct. But I have a very different interpretation of Sharon's
pullout from Gaza.

Well before Sharon was in office, I heard Middle East analysts speculating that a unilateral Israeli pullout from Gaza would spark a Palestinian civil war. When Sharon first proposed the pullout, I again heard commentators, including some Palestinians, say it would result in Palestinian civil war (I actually heard a few Palestinians condemn the pullout for this). I don't know if this was part of Sharon's idea, but certainly he was familiar with these arguments. I also don't know whether standing back and letting the Palestinians fight each other is a clever strategy or a strategic blunder, but regardless, it's not appeasement.

And arguably, a Gaza controlled exclusively by Hamas might in some ways be less a problem for Israel, because the open hostility of Hamas makes it much easier for Israelis to defend military responses to the world.

But more importantly, I think, Sharon recognized that in the long run Israeli occupation and settlement of Gaza was not viable. Eight thousand Israeli settlers among 1,300,000 Palestinians was an impossible
situation for the long run. They certainly could not be abandoned, but defending them would tie down much of the IDF permanently. Withdrawal from this untenable situation was simple necessity, not appeasement. This is why Sharon did it unilaterally, rather than asking for Palestinian quid pro quo.

This demographic problem is Israel's potential Achilles' heel. The Israeli Jewish population is roughly 5 million, with a population growth rate between 1 and 2 percent (CIA World Factbook says under 1.2%). Between West Bank and Gaza there are between 3.5 and 4 million Palestinians, with a population growth rate of slightly over 3% (again, CIA Factbook figures). The Israelis must avoid trying to permanently settle or occupy places where they are overwhelmingly outnumbered by hostile people.
They can do it for a period, perhaps a relatively long time, but it's not viable for the long run -- the financial costs alone are too great. And if an overwhelming majority is opposed to a ruling regime, that
majority will eventually depose the regime. Withdrawals from indefensible territory, including the removal of settlements, isn't appeasement, but a strategic necessity.

But the deeper problem (deeper than the hostility of Hamas and Fatah) is the terrible ill will towards Israel among Palestinians. Rightly or wrongly (in fact, it's some of both) too many of them see their misery as being first of all the fault of the Israelis. The one place the Israelis have blundered, in my opinion, is failing to try to win Palestinian "hearts and minds." The only acceptable permanent solution to the current mess is for Israelis and Palestinians to reach an accommodation (not appeasement), and this will require at least a modicum of good will between Israelis and Palestinians.

Of course, Hamas and Fatah have shown themselves utterly uninterested in this. But what Israel ought to have done, and should attempt now, is something along the lines of what made Hamas popular -- providing services to Palestinian refugees. When Fatah received funds, they set up Swiss bank accounts; when Hamas received funds, they set up schools and clinics, or at least so goes the
popular image among Palestinians. Israel needs to pursue something similar. Provide food and medical care for people's children, and it becomes difficult for them to hate you, even if they don't like you.

Furthermore, working to help develop the moribund Palestinian economy ought also be an Israeli priority. (I'm aware of at least one economics department at an Israeli university that has made this a major area of research.) If the Palestinian people face economic opportunities and rising incomes, they'll be more interested in peace that if they are poor, with little hope of being able to build a better future for themselves and their children.

An Israeli "hearts and minds" effort among the Palestinian people might seem farfetched, but what are the alternatives? The only alternatives to eventual peaceful accommodation that I can see are unacceptable "final solutions" with one group or the other exterminated, or permanent conflict. Israel's vigorous military responses to their enemies are only one half of what needs to be done. Actively working towards building better relations between people (again, not the hopeless Fatah or
vicious Hamas) is the second crucial step, and it should begin now.

Charles N. Steele is Assistant Professor of Economics at Hillsdale College.  He has previously taught economics at the graduate and undergraduate levels in China, Russia, and Ukraine.  He also has extensive professional experience as a private consultant in the insurance industry on problems of design and evaluation of insurance programs.

This TRA feature has been edited in accordance with TRA’s Statement of Policy.

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Learn about Mr. Stolyarov's novel, Eden against the Colossus, here..

Read Mr. Stolyarov's new comprehensive treatise, A Rational Cosmology, explicating such terms as the universe, matter, space, time, sound, light, life, consciousness, and volition, here.

Read Mr. Stolyarov's new four-act play, Implied Consent, a futuristic intellectual drama on the sanctity of human life, here.