In creating the Constitution, the American Founding Fathers designed the executive branch to impart the quality of energy to the republic -- necessary to defend it against foreign attacks and protect the property rights of citizens against internal threats (Federalist 70). The unity of the executive branch -- headed by a single President -- is necessary to furnish the “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” characterizing an energetic administration; it also increases the President’s accountability to the people and renders it easier to confine the executive power within its proper bounds (Federalist 70).

            The executive’s duration in office further secures the government’s stability: in Federalist 71, Publius writes that men in general are most interested in what they possess by a durable and certain title. The four-year term, with possibilities for re-election, offers an incentive for the executive’s competence, firmness, energy, independence, and willingness to guard against the people’s momentary erroneous impulses.

            The American republic also has an independent judiciary whose role is -- according to Publius -- to exercise judgment about the interpretation of the laws and the Constitution -- though it has no force or will of its own. As such, Publius considers the judiciary the “least dangerous branch,” because it does not have either the power of the sword or the power of the purse and must rely on the executive branch to give effect to its judgments (Federalist 81).

            Publius also considers necessary the judiciary’s function in rejecting laws deemed contrary to the Constitution; when two statutes clash, it is the role of the courts to reconcile them, and the superior law -- the supreme law of the land: the Constitution -- should be preferred to an inferior or subordinate law (Federalist 81).

            Brutus, on the contrary, sees the federal judiciary as “the most dangerous branch” (Brutus 15), as the Supreme Court justices have no power above them to control their decisions -- no authority to remove them or diminish their emoluments for errors in judgment or want of capacity.

            The Constitution, argues Brutus, provides no means for appealing decisions of the Supreme Court; the justices -- independent of all checks on their power -- will eventually act as if they were “independent of heaven itself” (Brutus 15). Furthermore, Brutus points to the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause as leading to a broad interpretation of the Constitution by the courts, which will allow an expansion of the general government’s scope far beyond that of the enumerated powers.

G. Stolyarov II is a science fiction novelist, independent philosophical essayist, poet, amateur mathematician, composer, contributor to Enter Stage Right, Le Quebecois Libre,  Rebirth of Reason, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Senior Writer for The Liberal Institute, weekly columnist for GrasstopsUSA.com, and Editor-in-Chief of The Rational Argumentator, a magazine championing the principles of reason, rights, and progress. Mr. Stolyarov also publishes his articles on Helium.com and Associated Content to assist the spread of rational ideas. His newest science fiction novel is Eden against the Colossus. His latest non-fiction treatise is A Rational Cosmology. His most recent play is Implied Consent. Mr. Stolyarov can be contacted at gennadystolyarovii@yahoo.com.

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Learn about Mr. Stolyarov's novel, Eden against the Colossus, here..

Read Mr. Stolyarov's new comprehensive treatise, A Rational Cosmology, explicating such terms as the universe, matter, space, time, sound, light, life, consciousness, and volition, here.

Read Mr. Stolyarov's new four-act play, Implied Consent, a futuristic intellectual drama on the sanctity of human life, here.