|
|
|
Apollo v. Stolyarov or How Not to Behave in an Argument G. Stolyarov II A Journal for Western Man-- Issue XXXVII-- July 13, 2005 |
|
Some people just do not
know how to be civil. They manifest this ignorance especially when they
encounter arguments to which they have no response. Having been
outwitted, they then stoop to malign their intellectual opponent in
every manner conceivable, forgetting that this displays no particular
talent nor advances one's case in any way. Unfortunately, far
too many of those people are self-proclaimed Objectivists. One such
Objectivist, who has shown his true colors in a recent e-mail exchange
with me, is Adrian Apollo. I seldom desire to breach all contact with a
given individual, but I have made this decision with regard to Mr.
Apollo after his insults had plainly become absurd. Unfortunately, Mr.
Apollo now seeks to convince other honest Objectivists that I am an
"enemy of the movement," because I happen to disagree with him on a
fairly technical issue of metafysics that neither Ayn Rand nor Leonard
Peikoff had specifically addressed. Therefore, I am obliged to defend
myself by displaying the simple truth: the transcript of our exchange.
There is a purely analytical facet to this debate that readers can find
interest in, even if they do not care about Mr. Apollo's grievance with
me, or do not question my integrity as a filosofer and advocate of
truth. I am convinced that I had won that debate, in the caliber,
precision, and amount of my arguments, most of which Mr. Apollo has
chosen not to answer prior to lapsing into personal attacks. May the
reader contemplate universal truths from those, and, from Mr. Apollo's
claims, may he learn how not to behave in an
argument.
But, let us begin at the beginning. Mr. Apollo had e-mailed me after reading a single article of mine, titled "Mistakes Concerning Infinity," included as Chapter IX in my new filosofical treatise, A Rational Cosmology. Mr. Apollo had not read my entire treatise (only Chapters I, and IX-XII are in the public domain), so I was inclined at first to think it understandable that he was not exposed to the full scope of my arguments regarding cosmology and ubiquitous observations about the natures of entities. His initial comment seemed to be a legitimate issue of disagreement, or perceived disagreement, and I decided to treat it as such. Mr. Apollo had chosen to forward his initial message to two other individuals, who remained an "audience" for the remainder of what transpired. The names of those individuals shall be kept confidential. My own interspersed comments about the debate shall occur to indicate exactly where and how the debate degenerated. They shall always be preceded by the words, "Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov." Message 1: From Adrian Apollo: July 11, 2005: "Euclidean space/time is to science a metafysical
given that mathematics must accept if it is to function in
this world."
This a very big mistake that Stolyarov
makes. There is no such thing as "Euclidean
space/time." Euclidean geometry is a *method* and not itself
anything other than a system of abstractions. The
abstractions refer to local phenomena, not the universe as a whole (or
to use his language, it does not refer to all of the
entities that we call the "universe" all at once.)
There can be no such thing as something(s) that
extends indefinitely in all directions, which is what a Euclidean
universe would have to do. Such a pseudo-conception is
inherently contradictory.
Based on what I read, I expect that his response
might be a floating abstraction that has to do with the concept of
"indefinite" or "extending indefinitely."
Adrian
Message 2: From G. Stolyarov II: July 11, 2005: Greetings.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "is no such thing as 'Euclidean
space/time.'" This is true. However, never have I said that Euclidean
space/time is a thing, or an entity in itself. I
had merely stated that it was a metafysical given. In fact, as Chapters
III and IV of my treatise demonstrate, Euclidean space/time is a
composite of four qualities which all
entities must have to some extent. That is, all entities must have some
measurement of length, width, height,
and time (measured by age). The Euclidean model is
then a series of tools we necessarily use to relate
these qualities to one another if we want to accurately understand
them-- and therefore it is permissible to label the qualities with the
adjective "Euclidean."
What indefinite space/time means is, we
can take any amount of entities with a measurement of X in any
dimension, lay them out side by side, and we will still be
able to do it, no matter how many entities we have, provided we take
the time to thus arrange them. There is no inherent limit to "the
universe qua universe" which would prevent us from doing so.
However, I stand by my assertion that what I refer to
as the four dimensional qualities of entities
are universal, in the sense that they are found in every individual
entity qua individual entity. (I explain this proper use of the
adjective, "universal," in Chapter II). Science, to the extent that it
seeks to retain a rational grounding, will need to accept these
qualities as a metafysical given in every entity that it seeks to
study; its job then becomes to interpret the magnitudes or
measurements of these qualities in particular entities, and how said
magnitudes affect those entities' behavior.
I am
G. Stolyarov II Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: So far, everything is civil. Let the reader note how I attempt to steer Mr. Apollo toward a more thorough understanding of my system by referencing specific chapters of my work, where the insights I briefly present in the message are clarified in greater depth. Message 3: From Adrian Apollo: July 11, 2005:
This sounds like a primacy-of-consciousness statement to me. If we are doing the "laying out" (creating mental representations), then what we have created only corresponds to reality if that's the way reality actually is. Since reality itself cannot extend indefinitely without limit, then there *is* an inherent limit. Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: There is evidently a disagreement here, and Mr. Apollo's "primacy of consciousness" accusation seems a bit rash, especially because Objectivism does not look kindly upon primacy of consciousness ideologies. However, the disagreement remains purely intellectual, and therefore within the bounds of proper conduct. Message 4: From G. Stolyarov II: July 11, 2005: Greetings.
Mr. Apollo wrote: "This sounds like a
primacy-of-consciousness statement to me. If we are doing the
'laying out' (creating mental representations), then what we have
created only corresponds to reality if that's the way reality actually
is. Since reality itself cannot extend indefinitely without
limit, then there *is* an inherent limit."
By "laying out," I mean not only a mental process,
but a fysical action. If we were to fysically lay out the entities in
the manner I had described, we would find that we would be able to do
so indefinitely. There is no such entity as reality qua reality;
it does not itself have any sort of expanse whatsoever. The term is
simply inapplicable to it. Only entities have expanse (i.e., volume,
which implies measurements in all three spatial qualities), and these
entities can also be separated from each other by any conceivable
magnitude. We can also arrange two entities five units apart, or
5*10^1000 units apart, and this arrangement will be possible, provided
that the natures of the entities themselves and
our fysical capacities as arrangers can facilitate it.
You make the mistake of treating reality (or
existence or the universe) as either an entity in itself or some basic
"fabric" which facilitates the spatial arrangement of entities. In
fact, no such "fabric" exists. Where there are no
specific entities, there are no specific entities. There is
no such "thing" as space, or vacuum, or ether, that
occupies the gaps. My statement is not a product of the primacy of
consciousness, but rather of the most rigorous adherence to the primacy
of existence. A is A. Where something is, it is.
Where something is not, nothing
is anything-- not even a "universal fabric" which has some
sort of limit associated with it. And to claim that there is a limit to
reality (or existence) begs the question: what is beyond this limit? If
it is something, then this something is beyond existence, and it
therefore does not exist (and therefore cannot be something).
If it is nothing, then there is nothing beyond existence, and existence
is all there is, and thus talking about a "limit" to it is
self-contradictory.
I am
G. Stolyarov II Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: I am extremely patient in countering the "primacy of consciousness" accusation directly by showing how my system does, in fact, display the primacy of existence. At that time, I still assumed nothing about Mr. Apollo and considered our disagreement to be an honest and honorable one. Even if he were not swayed by my arguments, I hoped that he would genuinely try to understand them and their interrelationships, at least. Message 5: From Adrian Apollo: July 11, 2005: This analysis definitely confuses imagination with
actuality, as I understand the analysis, and, as I predicted, involves
"indefiniteness" being misunderstood and used as a floating concept.
"If we were to fysically lay out the entities in the
manner I had described, we would find that we would be able to do so
indefinitely."
The manner being referred to is a "Euclidean" one and
that makes this is a meaningless statement. "Indefinitely,"
in this attempted usage, is just another word for infinity.
I.e., it amounts to the attempt to have "infinity" without calling it
"infinity."
You're attempting to get around the issue by saying
that only entities exist. It is true that only entities
exist, but they exist within a context with each other which prevents
such actions as being able to lay them out "indefinitely."
As for the concept "limit," you misinterpret my usage
of it because you actually do conceive of the universe as being
Euclidean (extending outwards in straight lines), which it is
not. Take the case of several objects being arranged in a
circle. There is a "limit," in such a scenario, as to how we
could apply the concepts "to the left of" and "to the right of," or
also "extends outwards." It wouldn't make sense to say that
something is "to the left of" something else, if we had to go all the
way around the circle. In that case, the concepts "left" and
"right" lose their meaning, because everything would
be to the left of and to the right of everything
else.
The same thing with "indefinitely" in such a
scenario. If we go all around the circle and come back to
where we started, then that shows a limit and that we cannot extend
outwards (around the circle) "indefinitely." Once we come
back to where we started, it would render the concept "extend"
meaningless if we tried to say that it continued to apply after we
mentally crossed back over our original object. That would
confuse our *conception* of the circle of objects with the circle of
objects itself. It confuses the *use* of concepts
with their denotation. No matter how many times we imagine
going around the circle, the fact is that there is only those finite
number of entities in the circle, not an infinite amount, and no such
phenomenon as "indefiniteness" is uncovered or identified, since there
are limits involved.
As to whether all the entities of existence exist
within such a circular context with each other is a matter for
science to decide and explain. Perhaps there is another type
of way they could relate to each other. But the purpose of
the illustration is to show what the concept "limit" means once one
avoids the pitfall of thinking that the universe is Euclidean, which it
cannot be and which amounts to an assertion which could have no meaning.
This is an example of the application of concepts
having limits, as AR mentions in IOE. When we say "table," we
don't include the possibility that a table exists with is 6 million
lights years tall.
There can be no such thing as the existence of
entities which have internal properties which would allow us to
"arrange" them in such an "indefinitely" outward extending Euclidean
fashion. That's the same thing as implying that infinity
exists, and we cannot get around the issue by saying that there is no
such thing as space qua space. That's a red
herring. Whether you call it "space" as a figure of speech,
or refer to it as "internal properties of entities," the analysis is
the same.
To speak about our ability to "arrange" objects is to
impose a primacy-of-consciousness view onto reality (i.e., onto the
things that exist) even if we say there is a physical process
involved. The question is not what *we* can do our imagine,
but what actually exists. Do entities actually exist which
extend outwards "indefinitely"? The answer is no (because the
statement has no meaning).
Euclidean geometry only applies to a finite subset of
reality in any one particular application of it, not to all of it at
the same time. Or, to use the other way of phrasing it
(avoiding the terms "reality" and "it"): Euclidean geometry does not
apply all at once to *all* the entities that exist in existence, only
some of them, in any one particular application of it.
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: This is the longest and most thorough post Mr. Apollo had made, and a decent attempt to craft rebuttals to my arguments. There is still the mild "primacy of consciousness" accusation, and the more grievous accusation of "confusing imagination with reality," though it was made of my analysis and not of me as a person. I let both of those slide as I prepared to address Mr. Apollo's particular arguments. Message 6: From G. Stolyarov II: July 11, 2005: Greetings.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "The manner being referred to is a
'Euclidean' one and that makes this is a meaningless
statement. 'Indefinitely,' in this attempted usage, is just
another word for infinity. I.e., it amounts to the attempt to
have 'infinity' without calling it 'infinity.'"
Yes, it is a Euclidean manner, because only a
Euclidean manner could correctly describe the spatial and temporal
qualities and entities, as well as their spatial and temporal
relationships to each other. However, nowhere is the attempt to have
"infinity" included. No matter how many entities we lay out in the
manner I described, it will always be a finite number of entities.
Indefiniteness only refers to the fact that we can always introduce one
more into the succession, and there will be nothing except our own
natures and the natures of entities involved to prevent us from doing
it. (I.e., if we are fysically tired and the entities repel each other,
then continuing this placement would be difficult at best, but if both
our capacities to place the entities and their capacities to remain
thus placed exist, no inherent property of existence can ever stop us.)
Mr. Apollo wrote, "You're attempting to get around
the issue by saying that only entities exist. It is true that
only entities exist, but they exist within a context with each other
which prevents such actions as being able to lay them out
'indefinitely.'"
How so? On what basis do you make such a blanket
assertion about the nature of all entities in general?
Do you have your evidence in ubiquitous observation, or in logical
deduction, or some combination of the two? On the contrary, I know that
both ubiquitous observation and logical deduction support my position.
Everywhere we look, we observe that no entity has an inherent "cap" on how
long it can exist-- only its nature determines the age it
will reach, and, by modifications to its nature, it can always extend
its possible age. This, then, must be true of both the entity which
arranges and the entities which are arranged in my example.
Furthermore, given knowledge of entities' properties, man has always
been able to arrange them in ways that yield greater measurements of
desirable qualities than had existed before. It is nothing short of a
claim to intellectual omniscience to state that, no matter how much we
learn about the natures of entities, there will always be something
preventing us from manipulating these entities in a way that does not
violate what we know about their natures. There is no basis in
ubiquitous observation for such a claim, and thus any _expression of it
is unfounded.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "As for the concept 'limit,' you
misinterpret my usage of it because you actually do conceive of the
universe as being Euclidean (extending outwards in straight lines),
which it is not."
The universe does not "extend out in straight lines,"
because it cannot extend, period. The lines are not properties of the
universe qua universe. The linear extension
exists only in the context of entitles, because every dimensional
quality of every particular entity is by necessity linear. (To say that
it is anything but is absurd. A circle implies by its
definition measurement parameters in two dimensions, and one does not
equal two. The same is true of any shape other than a line; zigzags,
parabolas, arcs, and circles can never be representative of single
dimensions.) Only when we have two or more entities simultaneously, or
the ability to relate a single entity's past, present, and/or
future positions, do we get the possibility of linear measurements of
the "space" between entities, which is just an _expression of how far
from another entity or from itself at a given time a certain entity is.
This is a relationship which can conceivably have any magnitude
whatsoever, but must have some finite magnitude. This is what I mean by
the concept of indefiniteness and the assertion that there is no limit
to existence as such.
Mr. Apollo writes, "Take the case of several objects
being arranged in a circle. There is a 'limit,' in such a
scenario, as to how we could apply the concepts 'to the left of' and
'to the right of,' or also 'extends outwards.' It wouldn't
make sense to say that something is 'to the left of' something else, if
we had to go all the way around the circle. In that case, the
concepts 'left' and 'right' lose their meaning, because
everything would be to the left of and to the right
of everything else."
This statement involves several errors. First, your
definitions of "left" and "right" are not proper as, in a circle, there
cannot be a single linear vector to describe the direction "left" and a
vector of opposite magnitude to describe the direction "right;" If you
have entities A, B, and C, where C is "right" of B and B is "right" of
A, the vector you draw from C to B will be directed in a wholly
different manner from the vector you draw from B to A. You cannot
logically describe this a single dimensional relationship, because you
would need at least two dimensions to relate the two vectors to each
other. Thus, strictly speaking, the terms "left" and "right" are
inapplicable when arranging entities in a circle. "Left" and "right,"
when I speak of arranging entities as I do, refer strictly to a
one-dimensional linear arrangement (the only sort of
linear arrangement there is). This linear arrangement can take
place when combining the parameters of any three
spatial qualities of entities arranged in such a
fashion, provided that the relationship of these parameters
always maintains a definite proportion and directional
orientation. (That is, you can arrange entities along the
diagonal between their width and height, or the
diagonal among their length, width, and height, provided that the
relationships of length, width, and height always remain constant for
the entitles thus arranged.)
Second, in order for the arrangement of entities in a
circle to be the inherent outcome when we try to
arrange entities linearly, "circularity" would need to be an inherent
property of the universe qua universe. There
would need to be some "universal fabric" which facilitates a "circular
path" onto which all entities are inevitably placed, and this begs the
question of what this fabric consists of, if not entities. In fact, no
such fabric can exist, because the universe is not an entity in itself.
Rather, the universe permits any sort of
spatial arrangement of entities, given that the natures of said
arrangements are recognized and observed. A circular
arrangement will never extend indefinitely, because it can by
definition encompass only a certain amount of certain entities
whose number cannot be increased without breaking the specific
circle. A linear arrangement, on the other hand, can encompass
any amount of a
certain type of entities, though it always has to be some
finite amount. A linear arrangement can never be a circular
arrangement, and vice versa. In a linear arrangement,
we cannot "go over" the same entities time and again, as we
might in a circular one, because a linear arrangement, by its nature,
does not permit such repetition. The two arrangements are not analogous
in that regard.
Mr. Apollo writes, "As to whether all the entities of
existence exist within such a circular context with each other
is a matter for science to decide and explain."
This is precisely the sort of task that is not
the province of the specific-observational sciences to
explain. They must accept as a given, derived from ubiquitous
observation, that entities can be arranged in any manner combining
three linearly measurable spatial parameters, and proceed only to study
the natures of specific arrangements of this sort. No amount of
specific observation can ever contradict ubiquitous observation, which
is the province of rational cosmology and is prior to the "hard
sciences."
Mr. Apollo wrote, "This is an example of the
application of concepts having limits, as AR mentions in IOE.
When we say 'table,' we don't include the possibility that a table
exists with is 6 million lights years tall."
While it is true that we know of no such tables, and
the engineering difficulty in building them would be tremendous, it
would be nothing short of a claim to omniscience to state that some
extremely advanced civilization would not someday be able to amass the
knowledge, skill, and desire to build one such table. Even if it never
happens (because I fail to see why somebody would want to
create such a table), the fact remains that there is nothing which
inherently rules out out the possibility of such a table being created,
other than the natures of the entities involved in creating it.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "To speak about our ability to
'arrange' objects is to impose a primacy-of-consciousness view onto
reality (i.e., onto the things that exist) even if we say
there is a physical process involved. The question is not
what *we* can do our imagine, but what actually exists. Do
entities actually exist which extend outwards 'indefinitely'?
The answer is no (because the statement has no meaning)."
First, our capacity to arrange objects fysically is
about as real as reality gets. Second, entities which extend outwards
indefinitely are encountered frequently. Take two boxes, arranged one
after the other. They are arrayed indefinitely, because, if we found a
fysical means to do it, we could place a third box such that the three
would be linearly arranged. We could place a fourth box, a seventeenth
box, a 10^65th box, once again, given that we had the means and the
will. The two boxes are arrayed indefinitely, because they do not run
up against some sort of "universal wall" which would prevent the
extension of their array, or even the distancing of the boxes from each
other.
Mr. Apollo, " Euclidean geometry does not apply all
at once to *all* the entities that exist in existence, only some of
them, in any one particular application of it."
The Euclidean geometry is a
method we use to study the entities, and thus it is true that it cannot
apply to all of them simultaneously, since we cannot study all of them
simultaneously. But the Euclidean qualities, the
dimensions of space and time, do exist
simultaneously in all entities of the universe, seeing as all which
presently exists exists simultaneously and exhibits the nature it does
at the same time, whether or not we are here to observe the particular
nature of a given particular entity. Existence exists, and each entity
has the qualities it has, independent of whether or not these qualities
are being observed.
I am
G. Stolyarov II Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Note the line-by-line specificity, impersonality, and analytical thoroughness of the arguments here. I am ready to flesh out entire small mathematical models just to demonstrate my point. All of my disagreements with Mr. Apollo are expressed under the consideration that his arguments are false, and would lead to a false claim of omniscience. However, this is a far smaller intellectual accusation than the "primacy of consciousness" one that he has kept repeating and one that carries much less stigma in the Objectivist community. It simply amounts to the claim that a given argument is not warranted by the scope of logical and empirical evidence presently available. While I did not expect Mr. Apollo to back down, I did at the time view him as of sufficient integrity to respond to my message in kind. Message 7: From Adrian Apollo: July 11, 2005: Wow.... There's quite a lot of mental gymnastics
going on here and I'm afraid it would require about $5000 worth of my
time to unravel it. I will try to chip away at it as it
coincides with my available time and interest.
For now, all I can say is that, in regards to your
conception of how Euclidean geometry applies to reality, you are guilty
of the fallacy of "reification," which means, in this case: taking a
concept of method and trying to make it a concept of
entities. (A similar example would be when a
person says that reality is "continuous," because he tries to
reify the "real numbers.")
Euclidean geometry is a method, and only a
method. It arises out of our analysis of how limited numbers
of entities relate to each other on a local level. The
attempt to introduce the pseudo-concept "indefinite," in this case,
represents the attempt to smuggle in the concept of infinity by giving
it another name. In actuality, the number of entities in the
universe must be finite (because existence has identity).
Therefore, the "indefiniteness" in question cannot exist based on that
fact alone. If the number of entities in the universe is
finite, then they cannot extend "indefinitely" (or be arranged in a
linear row in an "indefinite" fashion, if you want to avoid using the
word "extend.")
It is you, not me, who is claiming omniscience, when you claim that arrangements of entities extending outwards at right angles would *continue* to be at right angles with each other no matter how far out the arrangements extended. It is a matter of the special sciences to determine what would happen in such a scenario. There's no way you could predict what would happen in advance, based simply on the qualities and relationships of entities observed on a small scale. Other relationships may exist amongst the objects which may only be manifested on the large scale. It is you who is positing, on a
primacy-of-consciousness basis, that every scenario that could exist
should be regarded as being embedded in a Euclidean geometrical
system. In my example of left and right in the circle, I was
defining "left" and "right" in the context of that circle.
For you to object on the basis that "left" and "right" can only have
meaning when it applies to scenarios embedded in a Euclidean system is
arbitrary on your part.
Yes, there does indeed exist the possibility that
there are inherent properties of objects which could stop us from
arranging them linearly "indefinitely" at right angles to each
other. For you to rule that out by fiat is to make a
Rationalistic pronouncement and claim omniscience.
You write: 'Second, in order for the arrangement of
entities in a circle to be the inherent outcome when
we try to arrange entities linearly, "circularity" would need to be an
inherent property of the universe qua universe.
There would need to be some "universal fabric" which facilitates a
"circular path" onto which all entities are inevitably placed, and this
begs the question of what this fabric consists of, if not entities. In
fact, no such fabric can exist, because the universe is not an entity
in itself.'
This is totally and completely false. IF (a
big "if") the universe could be described as being hyperspherical or
hyperspheroidal, that does not require the existence of such a "fabric"
conception, but would only mean that that is how the entities in the
universe relate to each other. You are throwing the baby out
with the bath water here.
What we *do* know is that reality is *not* embedded
in a global Euclidean system, since such would be impossible and
unfathomable. Trying to assert such results in a
contradiction and produces a meaningless utterance. It's
reification.
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Mr. Apollo is showing the first signs of intellectual sloth by refusing to be as thorough in picking through my arguments as I have been regarding his. This is the first mild sign that the paradigm of the debate is moving away from the necessary presumption of the intellectual equality of the contenders. In this shift is implied the notion that I can be thorough, but Mr. Apollo does not have to. Of course, this message was somewhat thorough, and I still gave Mr. Apollo the benefit of the doubt, assuming that either he has legitimate other commitments consuming his time or that the "Wow" comment was meant as a veiled compliment for my thoroughness. Mr. Apollo tries to turn around the omniscience accusation, which I am still comfortable with. I will try to respond in the next letter by turning the claim back onto him. Message 8: From G. Stolyarov II: July 12, 2005: Greetings.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "For now, all I can say is that, in
regards to your conception of how Euclidean geometry applies to
reality, you are guilty of the fallacy of 'reification,' which means,
in this case: taking a concept of method and trying to make it a
concept of entities. (A similar example would be
when a person says that reality is 'continuous,'
because he tries to reify the 'real numbers.')"
I am not guilty of the above fallacy, because I am
not trying to conceive of Euclidean geometry in itself
as an entity or a quality. I explain this in quite extensive depth in
Chapter III. Rather, I am only stating that 1) Euclidean geometry is a
perfect method for evaluating the spatial qualities of entities and
that 2) there are real properties which the
methods of Euclidean geometry study, otherwise, Euclidean geometry
would not have been a useful method for studying entities. Because
Euclidean geometry is a perfect method for studying real spatial
properties, it follows that the real spatial properties are described
perfectly by this method.
The perfect validity of the Euclidean method can be
ascertained through what I would consider common sense. The shortest
distance between any two entities is a straight line. In order to
measure a given dimensional quality, it is nonsensical and
arbitrary to propose anything but uniform, linear units of measure.
When we combine this insight with ubiquitous observation, we understand
that any entity requires three, and only three, linear parameters to
measure its spatial expanse and one parameter to measure its
accumulation of time.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "In actuality, the number of entities in the universe must be finite (because existence has identity). Therefore, the 'indefiniteness' in question cannot exist based on that fact alone. If the number of entities in the universe is finite, then they cannot extend 'indefinitely' (or be arranged in a linear row in an 'indefinite' fashion, if you want to avoid using the word 'extend.')" Even if the number of entities in the universe is
finite, this still does not rule out my argument. For my argument to
hold, there only need to be at least two entities separated spatially
or at least one entity capable of changing its position with respect to
time. Two entities can have any magnitude of separation distance which
does not violate the particular natures of those entity. Similarly, an
entity once at position A can conceivably move any number of units away
from position A and still have this be possible, provided that the
entity's particular nature facilitates this.
Yes, each individual entity is limited in all of its
qualities at any given temporal instant. But there is no such thing as
a "universal" limit outside the limits of individual entities.
Furthermore, even though the law of conservation of
matter must hold, it is possible for new
entities to be created. Consider entity X splitting up into two
entities of an identical shape and volume, but with each entity half as
dense as entity X. This is within the law of conservation of
matter, and it allows for one more entity to come
about than previously existed. Now, consider what would happen
if we had a linear arrangement of
entities like X, and we were able to arrange all such entities
in existence in this fashion. Still, the arrangement is indefinite,
because entity X could split into two lighter entities of identical
shape and volume, and make the arrangement one entity longer. In this
case, there is always a finite number of entities in existence, and yet
the principle of indefiniteness holds.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "It is you, not me, who is claiming
omniscience, when you claim that arrangements of entities extending
outwards at right angles would *continue* to be at right angles with
each other no matter how far out the arrangements extended. "
I am not claiming omniscience, because a universe of
entities with Euclidean spatial properties is the only universe which
facilitates virtually any conceivable
arrangement of entities (and an arrangement in more than three spatial
dimensions does not qualify, because it is not conceivable). Thus, my
theory is the only one that does not inherently rule out any
particular shape in which entities can be arranged, or the distance
separation between them. It is possible for entities to be arranged in
an extremely large circle in such a universe, but the only requirements
for this arrangement are that it not contradict its own nature,
i.e., exhibit the properties of some other incompatible arrangement,
such as a linear one. And of course, along with the large circular
arrangement, others are possible that the circular arrangement does not
nullify.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "It is a matter of the special
sciences to determine what would happen in such a
scenario. There's no way you could predict what would happen
in advance, based simply on the qualities and relationships of entities
observed on a small scale. Other relationships may exist
amongst the objects which may only be manifested on the large scale."
What my theory seeks to bring about is a knowledge of
ubiquitous properties which all
entities have. The special sciences cannot furnish this
knowledge, because they by definition depend on particular experiments.
A particular experiment, via the inherently limited scope of its
examination, can only give us an understanding of the properties of
particular entities-- it can never provide sufficient information to
generalize about all entities, no matter what they are or what their
particular measurements might be. Only ubiquitous observation can
furnish the raw material out of which fundamental existential
generalizations can be deduced. Only those
observations that we cannot escape in the course of our functional,
daily lives can be used to make universally applicable logical
conclusions, and Euclidean space/time, without a single demonstration
to the contrary, has been such an observation.
As for relationships among entities, while it is true
that other relationships might exist on a smaller or larger scale, they
can never violate the relationships and
qualities we do know to exist and be universally applicable. Thus, no
matter how extremely small subatomic particles or vast stars interact
with one another, they must always exhibit the Euclidean spatiotemporal
qualities. A specific discovery can never invalidate ubiquitous
observation, or render it any less than ubiquitous. Any statement to
the contrary is a concession that man's sensory perception of space and
time is invalid.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "In my example of left and right in
the circle, I was defining 'left' and 'right' in the context of that
circle. For you to object on the basis that 'left' and
'right' can only have meaning when it applies to scenarios embedded in
a Euclidean system is arbitrary on your part."
What I maintain is that all definitions must
consistently refer to the same existents. If, within a
given scope of observation, "left" is defined as being one
vector in one instance and a wholly different
vector in every other instance, then there is inconsistent, equivocal
application of the definition. In the course of any integrated system
of observations that we seek to make, we need
to establish a single definition
of "left" (or any other term) and stick to it. The
only consistent way to do this is to define "left" and "right" along a
linear continuum, which ensures that they always refer to the same
vector. Thus, Euclidean geometry is the only fully consistent method
for measuring the real spatial qualities of entities and for using the
terms, "left" and "right" accurately.
What is arbitrary is your decision
to skip from one definition of a given term to another at your
convenience, within the same system of observations. This would be the
equivalent of a person defining measurement units by switching
definitions: the span from zero meters to one meter is twice as long as
the span from one meter to two meters. Surely, with such sloppy use of
definitions, the very meaning and utility of measurement units would be
eliminated, just as, with your usage of "left" and "right," the meaning
and utility of those terms is eliminated, and they could be molded to
say whatever you want them to say.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "Yes, there does indeed exist the
possibility that there are inherent properties of objects which could
stop us from arranging them linearly 'indefinitely' at right angles to
each other. For you to rule that out by fiat is to make a
Rationalistic pronouncement and claim omniscience."
Those "inherent properties" would belong to particular
objects and particular objects only.
If a given type of entity is incapable of being thus arranged, this
says nothing about any other type of entity,
because this property is not ubiquitous. This property is not
ubiquitous because it has not been ubiquitously and inescapably
observed by healthy, functional human beings, and must therefore belong
to only some entities, and not others, if such a property exists in the
first place.
On the "circularity" of the universe, Mr. Apollo
wrote, "This is totally and completely false. IF (a big 'if')
the universe could be described as being hyperspherical or
hyperspheroidal, that does not require the existence of such a 'fabric'
conception, but would only mean that that is how the entities in the
universe relate to each other. You are throwing the baby out
with the bath water here."
First, the description of the universe as
having any "shape" whatsoever implies the description of the universe
as having properties qua universe, which is an
improper view of the universe as an entity. If it is not an entity, it
cannot have a shape, and entities can conceivably arranged in any
manner whatsoever, provided that this manner is itself and exhibits its
own properties, not the properties of an arrangement which it is not.
Furthermore, any "shape" is a shape of something,
implying that it is matter which is shaped in
this way. Either you will have to concede the false "universal fabric"
premise to give matter to the shape (though you will still have to
explain the contradiction of why this matter is massless), or you will
admit that it is not a shape of something, and therefore cannot be the
shape of the universe, since the universe cannot have any shape, not
being an entity in itself which is composed of matter that is strictly
a property of the entity, "universe."
Yes, entities with Euclidean qualities can be
arranged in a sferical manner and thus relate to each other; my model
of the universe does not rule this out. What it rules out is the
contradiction of a non-sferical arrangement (such as a linear one) also
being a sferical arrangement.
Mr. Apollo wrote, "What we *do* know is that reality
is *not* embedded in a global Euclidean system, since such would be
impossible and unfathomable. Trying to assert such results in
a contradiction and produces a meaningless utterance."
Claiming that it is impossible does not make it so,
especially when all the evidence of the senses, in every
single instance, is arrayed against such a claim. Not only
is the Euclidean system devoid of contradictions, but it is the only
system for explaining spatiotemporal qualities which is entirely free
of contradictions.
I am G. Stolyarov II
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: This is, again, written in my style of expressing actual ideas in some depth and responding to claims in a point-by-point fashion. There is the discussion of whose claims are "arbitrary," and I turn back Mr. Apollo's arbitrariness accusation onto him in the definition of "left" and "right" debate. This is still appropriate, as it is the arguments that are being called arbitrary (i.e., unwarranted), not the people involved. The next message, however, was the critical "breaking point" of the discussion. Message 9: From Adrian Apollo: July 12, 2005: "I am not claiming omniscience, because a universe of
entities with Euclidean spatial properties is the only universe which
facilitates virtually any conceivable
arrangement of entities (and an arrangement in more than three spatial
dimensions does not qualify, because it is not conceivable)."
Mr. Stolyarov,
Please do yourself a favor and learn about
Rationalism before you announce to the world that you are following Ayn
Rand's philosophy. This paragraph above is the quintessential
Rationalistic argument. You are not *inducing* your ideas
from entities, but are rather attempting to *deduce* their properties
starting from ideas.
I cannot explain it to you more clear than that.
Other than that, it is very clear from your writings
that you are attempting to have the *shape* of a universal fabric
*without* the fabric itself! The entities of the universe are
not embedded in an empty Euclidean fabric-less shell, as your premises
seem to show.
Do yourself a favor and show that paragraph to an
Objectivist leader whom you trust. They will immediately
recognize that it is Rationalistic. Perhaps then you will
decided it is worth your while to reevaluate your method of
reasoning. Please!
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Mr. Apollo, whose standards of conduct had hitherto gradually declined, has now crossed the bounds of propriety. He has first evaded an entire lengthy post where I had addressed his claims in depth. Implicit in that decision was the statement that he did not expect of himself the same degree of intellectual rigor or thoroughness as I had assumed in the debate. Along with intellectual sloth, Mr. Apollo has displayed intellectual contempt for his opponent, accusing him of being ignorant of Objectivism (or the filosofy that he is accused of asserting) simply because of an honest disagreement. At the same time, Mr. Apollo's argument includes an unconditional appeal to authority which is the true un-Objectivist claim here. I presume that Mr. Apollo had realized that he could not contend with my arguments in precision and thoroughness. Thus, he has employed the "shortcut" tactic of attacking the person (ad hominem) and poisoning the well against him, so as to make him seem ignorant and, therefore, for his arguments to appear inherently unworthy before they are presented or examined. Mr. Apollo will capitalize on this later, and will never again regain any standard of propriety. Message 10: From G. Stolyarov II: July 12, 2005: Mr. Apollo,
Your accusation of Rationalism holds no merit,
because you ignore the fact that my method is inductive in its basic
step: in the fact that I use as my fundamental data the observations
that no healthy, functional human being can avoid making. Since no
particular experiment can refine them, the only further way to study
this type of observation is deductive. All I am claiming is that
knowledge of the validity of Euclidean space/time does not depend on some
particular observation, but rather on any set of
observations whatsoever which human beings can make and do
make.
It is your method which is fundamentally
Empiricist-Positivist, in that you claim that any conclusion can only
be based on some particular observation,
therefore not only ruling out the deductive method (and thus logic
itself), but also improperly extending the narrow scope of a given
experimental observation onto the entire universe and holding the
universe to be as limited as that experimental observation (which is
essentially the error of modern science's attempt to make existential
generalizations, an occupation which is not its legitimate province).
No particular entity can give
us the answer to fundamental questions as to what the spatiotemporal
qualities are. Only those properties which are, without exception,
observed in all entities we encounter on a daily basis can do this. In
fact, you are ignoring genuine induction by
neglecting this, the most fundamental caliber of observation.
Furthermore, I must ask you, how is it even possible
to have the ideas of Euclidean geometry (or any
idea of what space, time, or any other ubiquitous quality is) without
having performed observations of real entities at
some point, and realized that the concepts and methods of Euclidean
geometry had to be observed in real entities in the first place? All
that I am claiming is that the entity observed could be any entity
and does not have to be some particular one in
order for it to give the Euclidean method what it needs to
function.
What we know from ubiquitous observation is that all
entities can be related to each other spatially by three parameters and
temporally by one. To say that there are any other restrictions to
these relations which are broader than the restrictions existing due to
the natures of particular entities, and yet which are
not derived from ubiquitous observation, is to claim
omniscience. The only way not to claim
omniscience is to state that we cannot rule out any conceivable
arrangement until we know the entities involved. This can only be done
by conceding Euclidean space/time. How this is a Rationalistic
pronouncement rather than an attempt to avoid blatant
Empiricism-Positivism, I know not.
Furthermore, a universe of entities with Euclidean
spatiotemporal properties is the only universe which does not
have a shape! Could you please describe to
me the shape you are alleging the model of my universe has? Where are
its boundaries? All shapes must have boundaries in at least one
dimension, or else the very concept of "shape" becomes absurd and
inapplicable.
It is precisely because the universe is not an entity that it cannot have a shape, in which case space/time must be Euclidean, because it is only in this way that we can rule out any restrictions to the arrangement of entities outside the nature of those entities themselves. As for your latter request, I hold no authority above
that of my rational mind; anyone may feel free to disagree with me and
try to convince me of the validity of their disagreement, but I will
not take something I disagree with to be the truth simply because a
particular person, no matter who he/she may be, says it. I
do not need the pronouncements of authorities external to myself to
justify the validity of ideas which have their basis in reason, common
sense, and the unavoidable evidence of the senses.
I am G. Stolyarov II Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: I am patient and slow to judge, perhaps too much so. Instead of immediately recognizing a personal accusation and ending the debate, I once again counter the accusation directly by showing its falsehood through logic and saying nothing about the person making it. I also note here that Mr. Apollo has been mistaken enough to accept the very same critical fallacy I had refuted in the first chapter of A Rational Cosmology, the fallacy of empiricism-positivism. Message 11: From Adrian Apollo: July 12, 2005: You're going to have to start making these e-mails
shorter, because if I see flaws in your basic premises, I'm not going
to go into every branch of your reasoning.
I only have the time and patience to discuss the most
fundamental ideas with you.
" All I am claiming is that knowledge of the validity
of Euclidean space/time does not depend on some particular
observation, but rather on any set of
observations whatsoever which human beings can make and do
make. "
Your "any set of observations whatsoever" phrase is
Rationalistic. (The "whatsoever" is the key word that shows
you are jumping into a Rationalistic realm of reasoning.)
True inductive reasoning *generalizes* from particulars. It
can never leap into a combinatorial or Rationalistic realm of
considering all "possible" cases. That is a false and
Rationalistic use of the concept of "possibility."
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: This is now sheer condescension on Mr. Apollo's part. He does not see it worth his while to discuss this matter with any degree of thoroughness, but he patronizingly throws me a bone by offering to discuss only the "fundamentals." Whatever the fundamentals of this debate are now, in Mr. Apollo's opinion, they were not that way when we started. As the reader will notice, the territory of this debate has clearly shifted due to Mr. Apollo's constant attempts to hammer me in another place when he cannot respond to my original defenses of the integrity of my system. The root of all of this is intellectual laziness on Mr. Apollo's part. He does not wish to read a lot, write a lot, or think a lot about anything except what he falsely defines as a fundamental based on where he can attack me the best at the given moment. He does, however, wish to win, and thinks that he will have higher chances by presuming himself my intellectual superior "gracing" me with the gift of his time. If there is one thing I cannot stand, it is sloth. Message 12: From G. Stolyarov II: July 12, 2005: Mr. Apollo,
You write, "True inductive reasoning *generalizes*
from particulars. It can never leap into a combinatorial or
Rationalistic realm of considering all "possible" cases."
I would advise you to read Chapter I of A
Rational Cosmology. Here, you have essentially conceded the
mentality of Empiricism-Positivism.
"Very mildly put,
empiricism-positivism holds, as its fundamental tenet, that any
assertion, no matter how general, depends on some particular
observation."
As I show, this mentality is devastating for science, and even leads one to deny the axioms, because the axioms are implicitly known by every human being once that person has made any observation whatsoever, thus indicating that the axioms, and all of filosofy, are learned by the method I have described. I am Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: This is an extremely short e-mail. Whatever improprieties he has displayed, I am still willing to accommodate Mr. Apollo's request, because I remain open to the possibility that he means well. I do refer him to a more thorough work which displays his fallacies on this issue. Message 13: From Adrian Apollo: July 12, 2005: Mr. Stolyarov,
No, no, no! Double and triple no!
This link above (that you wrote) shows clearly that
you have not carefully studied "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn
Rand" by Leonard Peikoff and you do *not* understand the concept of
"contextual absoluteness," which is the bedrock of
Objectivism. You have no conception of the Objectivist
position on how knowledge is induced from particulars, and how, once it
is properly induced, it is contextually absolute.
Please, Mr. Stolyarov. Are you being honest
with yourself? I don't see how you could be an honest thinker and write
what you do. Your understanding of Objectivism is very, very
weak. You are promulgating a false interpretation of
Objectivism which is very, very injurious to the Objectivist
movement. Please honor Ayn Rand's request and do *not* call
yourself an Objectivist, if you have any respect for Ayn
Rand at all.
Adrian Apollo
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Now, the personal accusations have become dire, and all the falser for it. In truth, I have read Peikoff's book, cited Peikoff's book elsewhere, and agree with what he writes there! My only disagreement is with Mr. Apollo, who fails to show how Peikoff's ideas on contextual certainty support exclusively his point of view and not mine. Mr. Apollo simply uses Peikoff's book as a "trump card" against me, without justifying his accusation in any way. This is, again, a device to make him seem intellectually superior and to cast me as inherently ignorant, and dishonest, to add to the avalanche of personal insults. Message 14: From G. Stolyarov II: July 12, 2005: Mr. Apollo,
This is a plainly unsubstantiated accusation on your part. 1) I have read Peikoff's book and have even cited it
in my other works; it is not my understanding of the contents therein
that is weak, it is your willingness to violate the sacred cow which is
twentieth-century "science" and extend the principles of Objectivism to
their logical conclusion that is lacking.
2) Your accusations are not supported by specific
evidence, examples, and analysis. You are essentially claiming that I
am wrong and ignorant of Objectivism without saying why. I wonder, is
that an Objectivist thing to do?
3) You have failed to answer my most essential
challenge: Are the axioms of Objectivism induced from some
single specific observation or set thereof, or can they be
induced by observing anything whatsoever? If
you advocate the former claim, what specific observation (or
set thereof) is required to reach the axioms?
I am
G. Stolyarov II
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: I am evidently not pleased here, yet I maintain the required civility. I do not personally insult Mr. Apollo, instead only pointing out that he is wrong to unconditionally rely on the validity of 20th century "science" as he does, and questioning whether his tone in prior messages was compatible with Objectivist ethics. Furthermore, I myself try to confront him on the "new" fundamentals of this debate (i.e., to beat him at his own game) and try to steer him back into the realm of actual argument. Alas, my techniques work only on honest argumentators, and Mr. Apollo, in his next message, clearly shows that he is not one. Message 15: From Adrian Apollo: July 12, 2005: If you don't know the Objectivist response to 3, then
how can you possibly claim to be an Objectivist or even be
knowledgeable of it. This is Objectivism 101.
Yes, the axioms of Objectivism are *induced* from
observations, many of them! They are high-level abstractions
which are the result of many chains of inductions (and deductions which
are dependent upon those inductions).
I *did* say why! You clearly have no
conception whatsoever of the Objectivist position of contextual
absoluteness, which is certainly not in accord with the popular
philosophical positions of the 20th century ideas you reference.
Please, Mr. Stolyarov. I have had enough of
this. Be an honest intellectual and try to *understand* OPAR,
rather than just quote from it.
Your idea about the axioms being "implicit" in one's
thinking is so obviously Kantian that any Objectivist worth his salt
would recognize it right away. You are either philosophically
incompetent, or dishonest (or some combination thereof.)
Please don't insult my intelligence by continuing in your M.O.
Kant is the enemy of Objectivism. You are
positioning yourself into being an intellectual enemy of Objectivism.
Enough said.
AA
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: The first paragraf above is plainly evasive and dishonest. I had already known the answer to #3 before I posed the question (the answer is the second alternative in the dilemma). The question itself was a device used to get Mr. Apollo to see the fallacy in the first alternative by stating it clearly. And, indeed, that question was at the core of our disagreement, and, if Mr. Apollo wanted to maintain the impression that he could win the argument, he had to blank out on it and dishonestly accuse me of being the nemesis of Objectivism in an attempt to avoid the issue. The accusation regarding OPAR is sheer snobbery. In no intellectual is an understanding of a work is more thorough than in one who has not only read the book, but also applied its contents to further analysis of his own. (My copy of OPAR is filled with underlines and marginal comments from cover to cover.) Mr. Apollo is, in effect, stating that, no matter whether I have read and applied the book, I will never "understand" it. That faculty is the arcane, exclusive province of him and those agree with his particular positions in this debate. Finally, Mr. Apollo brings Kant into this exchange for the first time. Ayn Rand detested Kant (perhaps too vehemently so), and this sort of accusation is among the gravest in Objectivist circles. I note that I had not once mentioned Kant or supported anything he wrote in this debate. Message 16: From G. Stolyarov II: July 12, 2005: Greetings.
This is ridiculous.
Is this how an Objectivist purports to deal with
somebody who honestly disagrees with him on an extremely complex issue?
To launch unwarranted accusations, without knowing the person, what he
has read, what he has contemplated, and what his intentions are? To
claim that somebody who disagrees with his unthinking acceptance of
20th-century "science" is a Kantian? (Please note that I had not once
mentioned Kant in this entire exchange, nor will you find me citing him
in a supportive manner anywhere on The Rational Argumentator.)
Clearly, you are 1) psychologizing, 2) unable to hold
a tolerant, civil discourse, and 3) demanding unconditional acceptance
of your view (which neither Rand nor Peikoff had ever offered support
for) as a criterion for being a "friend of Objectivism" or even not
being an enemy thereof. It is you, with your
inquisitorial tactics, who would be the true foe of Objectivism, if
there is one between the two of us.
Finally, I do know the
Objectivist response to my #3. I also know that it is not in line with your
response. I was asking the question deliberately to
indicate the contradiction. You equivocated in your response in that
you failed to answer whether or not some single set
of observations is necessary to induce the axioms, and whether or not
somebody who did not experience that specific set of observations would
not have knowledge of the axioms.
It is my impression that you are desperate just to
win the argument, and not to ascertain the truth, and are therefore
beginning to launch ad hominem accusations,
seeing as you were not able to assert your claims civilly
and solely on their own merits.
I am
G. Stolyarov II Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Indeed, my patience has expired, and I have pointed out the absurdity of Mr. Apollo's attacks. At this point, I will take no further nonsense from him. Any intricate intellectual facets of this debate that interested me have now vanished, and I am no longer in doubt as to Mr. Apollo's lack of integrity. This conviction took a while to obtain. Message 17: From Adrian Apollo: July 12, 2005: No, my dear, sir. You do not read
carefully. I assume you simply do not want to hear what I am
saying.
One, your knowledge of Objectivism is not extensive
enough to be portraying yourself as some sort of expert on
it. This is very, very clear, since you miss the very clear
explanation in OPAR of what contextual certainty is.
I know very well you did not use the name Kant, but I
am saying that your philosophy is Kantian, whether you realize it or
not. If you don't understand that distinction, then you're in
over your head.
No, this is not ridiculous. I am offended
that you would portray yourself as being knowledgeable about
Objectivism, when you are obviously not. I am simply telling
you what you need to hear.
You continue to make reference to trends in 20th
century science to which I do not adhere. You would know this
if you understood the Objectivist position on contextual certainty.
What is ridiculous is your ignorance of Dr. Peikoff's
portrayal of the Objectivist position on certainty on pp. 171-181 of
OPAR.
Please make your e-mails shorter and stick to the
essentials. I did not read your entire e-mail (below).
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: Mr. Apollo here flaunts his blatant laziness as if it were an asset, bragging about how he did not read my extremely short Message 16. At this point, I was determined to tolerate his tone no longer. I invite everybody to read the pages Mr. Apollo had referenced. Nowhere will you find any refutation of any claim I had advanced. Quite the contrary, Peikoff's ideas are quite in line with my own on this (Peikoff even rejects quantum mechanics elsewhere, but that is a different subject). I will even furnish an excerpt as a post scriptum to this article, so as to demonstrate why Peikoff's words support my arguments, not Mr. Apollo's. Message 18: From G. Stolyarov II: July 13, 2005: Mr. Apollo,
" I did not read your entire e-mail (below)."
If you are going to continue evading, blanking out,
and flatly and blatantly ignoring the other
side's arguments, then there is no further purpose to this discussion.
Your methods are clearly unfair, condescending, and intellectually
dishonest. Why is it that it takes me nearly no effort whatsoever to
read and understand what you have written, while you are not even
willing to consider a similar level of commitment to this discussion?
If you do not wish to discuss the actual arguments I
have made, fine. But I will not let this degenerate into a one-sided
shouting match with my moral sanction.
Either change your ways, apologize for all
ad hominem accusations you have made, or do not expect
me to respond further. Unless the word "Apology" appears in the title
of the next message you send, I will automatically delete anything else
I receive from you.
I am G. Stolyarov II
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: I am, at this point, not interested in discussing anything with Mr. Apollo. He has behaved abominably, and must either admit the error of his insult-based methods, or not expect me to graciously take any more from him. Message 19: From Adrian Apollo, Subtitled "Wow!": July 13, 2005: D-- and R--,
Wow..... Can you believe how Stolyarov is
evading my clear points by accusing me of evading when he is the one
who is evading? This is really incredible and very revealing.
This guy totally distorts the Objectivist view on the
primacy of induction and certainty. Then when it is pointed
out to him that his ideas are obviously in conflict with Ayn Rand's and
Peikoff's, tries to avoid addressing that fact by getting into all
sorts of side arguments and evading the main issue.
When I tell him I'm not going to pay attention to his
side arguments and I only want to stick to the main issue (the
fundamental premises), he accuses me of evasion!
That's an interesting form of evasion on his
part. Bury your opponent in a smoke screen of side arguments
while avoiding the fundamental issues. Then when he tries to
get you to focus on the main issues, accuse him of evading!
R--, are you promoting this guy on your ******
website? I beg you to reexamine his work and
reconsider. This sort of thing is very harmful to
Objectivism, when somebody like this guy distorts it the way he does.
Adrian
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: I was ready to delete this message, when I recognized how telling it was of Mr. Apollo's true nature. Once Mr. Apollo realizes that I will not play along, he seeks to malign me to others, as if that will vindicate his conduct. He tries to punish me by influencing a break in a productive association of mine with another individual (who did not, to his credit, give in to Mr. Apollo's suggestion). Furthermore, he once again accuses me of violating the Objectivist view on certainty without stating what that view is! Had he done so outright, it would have been obvious that there is no conflict between my and Peikoff's systems. Then, he accuses me of evading that which he himself failed to bring into the debate! The irony here is that Mr. Apollo is twice an evader, once in regard to my claims, and the second time in regard to his own, evading the precise nature of what it was that Peikoff really wrote. Message 20: From Adrian Apollo, Subtitled, "Why I will not and do not need to apologize": July 13, 2005: Mr. Stolyarov,
Come on now. Are you being honest with
yourself?
How on earth can you charactize [sic] me as evading
when I have been trying to get you to address the fundamental
issues? When I say that I will not read or pay attention to
your side issues, that does not mean I am evading the main one.
If you are honest with yourself, you will see that
this is a form of evasion on your part.
Your views are very, very clearly in
conflict with the Objectivist view of the primacy of induction and
contextual certainty. You want to keep dancing around this
fact and ignore me when I point it out to you.
I am not evading at all. I have always been
willing to discuss and argue the fundamentals. Once I see
that your e-mail is evading the fundamental issue, I am under no
obligation to read your entire e-mail. If I bite into a
rotten egg, I don't have to eat the whole egg to know that it is rotten.
Shame on you.
AA
Reflection by Mr. Stolyarov: The initial "fundamental" issue of this debate had been whether or not the spatiotemporal qualities were Euclidean, and Mr. Apollo had repeatedly shifted the debate's focus at his convenience, specifically to evade my successful attempts to defend myself. Let the reader judge for himself who has been the evader here. As a criterion for judgment, consider how many arguments from Mr. Apollo have I deemed fit to respond to, and how often Mr. Apollo has returned the favor. Instead of an apology, Mr. Apollo continued his barrage of accusations (the newest one being the "rotten egg," i.e., any idea he disagrees with). I will no longer allow my personal mailbox to be a forum for him to make these accusations. Nonetheless, he may seek to "warn" others about me in the future, and I am therefore compelled to publish the truth, so that there might be no doubt as to who was the better argumentator, and the more civil one, in this debate. From all this, I am left to induce a most important conclusion: no rational discourse is possible without the presumption of intellectual equality on both sides. This means that a given argumentator might think that his side is true and the other side is false, but, unless there exists a bilateral respect for the other side's intelligence, capacity to make rational arguments, and understanding of the subject, there cannot be a productive exchange of ideas. Mr. Apollo's conduct essentially reflected a sofisticated version of the sofomoric, "You're stupid!" argument. This is never a productive way to engage the other side. If one is losing a debate, he should recognize why and try his best to salvage the situation using his rational faculty. If he cannot, this means he should concede the validity of the position which had refuted his own. Under no conditions should he initiate insults against the other side. I am Post Scriptum: I have taken the liberty to cite here an excerpt from Peikoff's chapter on contextual certainty, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 179-180: "Once, when I was a college student, an instructor defending skepticism declared to the class: 'You think I am Professor X. But how do you know I'm not an impostor, a consummate actor taking the professor's place?' Transpose this question to your own situation. How can you be certain when you attend a lecture that it is Y, a man you know well, who is speaking, rather than an impostor? "In this case, the standard of validation is the direct testimony of your eyes and ears, as identified conceptually and then integrated to whatever other knowledge of yours is relevant. Judged by this standard, the proper conclusion to draw is outside the realm of doubt. All the available information-- everything you observe and everything you know-- leads to your identification of the speaker: the occasion, his appearance, his tone of voice, his facial expressions, his posture and gestures, the content of his prepared remarks, the quality of his extemporaneous jokes, his knowledge of your name and face, and so one. If a skeptic were to say: 'But man does have the ability to impersonate others; so isn't it at least possible that the speaker is an actor?' the reply would have to be: 'That is a non sequitur. On what basis do you claim someone's exercise of this human ability here and now? Is there an iota of evidence to support such a hypothesis in this context?' Of course, there is not." Now, to extrapolate this example onto my assertion that all spatiotemporal qualities are Euclidean in nature. If all available information, observed by human beings every moment of their existence, has supported this claim, and not a single iota of evidence has been found to the contrary, then does this not qualify for a proposition of which we can be contextually certain? When have we ever observed an entity whose spatiotemporal qualities were exhibited in any fashion but a Euclidean one? This is what I mean by ubiquitous observation, a quality or relationship that we observe persistently during our lives, cannot ultimately avoid observing, and which has never been absent in any entity we have observed. Can we not, by the standards Peikoff illustrates, be contextually certain of those ubiquitous observations' (and their logical derivatives') absolutism? How many times have I made this observation, and how many times has Mr. Apollo outright ignored it, and was proud of it? Might this also have been why Mr. Apollo hesitated referring to the particular arguments in Peikoff's book, that is, to avoid feeding my case further? G. Stolyarov II is a science fiction novelist, independent filosofical essayist, poet, amateur mathematician and composer, contributor to organizations such as Le Quebecois Libre, Enter Stage Right, the Autonomist, and Objective Medicine. Mr. Stolyarov is the Editor-in-Chief of The Rational Argumentator. He can be contacted at gennadystolyarovii@yahoo.com. This
TRA feature has been edited in accordance with TRA's Statement
of Policy. Click here to return to TRA's Issue XXXVII Index. Learn about Mr. Stolyarov's novel, Eden against the Colossus, here.Read Mr. Stolyarov's comprehensive treatise, A Rational Cosmology, explicating such terms as the universe, matter, space, time, sound, light, life, consciousness, and volition, here. Visit TRA's Principal Index, a convenient way of navigating throughout the issues of the magazine. Click here. |
