The world given to us in perception,
the base of all our knowledge, is a world of entities—of shoes and
ships and (lumps of) sealing wax, of cabbages and kings. The task of
the theorist is to show how each concept and principle is derived from
our perceptions of entities. |
Introduction
Some concepts are implicit in every
perception, and are the base of all other concepts.
These are the axiomatic concepts: existence, identity, consciousness.
To perceive a thing is to perceive that it exists. To perceive
a thing is to perceive that it is something. To perceive a
thing is to perceive that one is conscious. Axiomatic concepts
cannot be defined in terms of other concepts because they are
logically prior to all other concepts.
These axiomatic concepts can be combined into formal axioms.
Existence exists: there are things. Existence is identity:
to be is to be something: things are what they are. (which is the law
of identity) Consciousness is identification: to be conscious
is to be conscious of existence.
No proof can be offered for these, nor is any needed: it is self
contradictory to deny them, for they must be accepted and used in
every such denial. I.e., they are self-evident. (see Ayn Rand,
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Ch. 6)
Axiomatic concepts and axioms are the root of all objectivity, of
logic, and of honesty. Face it, there is no honest denial of
the fact that things exist, or that they have some definite nature, or
that one is conscious of them.
|
Time and
existence
There are other fundamental concepts
whose link to entities has not been entirely clear, concepts that are
crucial to our understanding of the world. One such concept is time.
We perceive a world of entities which come to be, move and change,
and cease to be. These entities, changes and movements all exist,
yet some exist, or last, or endure, more or less than others.
Our identification of this more or less of existence—the "how long" of
existence—is time.
Every existent whatever can be measured by time. For example, time
measures entities: that man has existed for 50 years. And so, time
measures the quantities, qualities relations—and so on through every
category—of those entities. In short, time is a measure of
existence.
This is based on induction. I invite you to review all of
existence, trying to find a single existent which you cannot measure
by time. You will fail to find one.
It is often said (following Aristotle) that time is a measure of
motion, but this misses the full generality of time. Aristotle himself
was not misled by his formulation, for he went on to say that
because time is a measure of motion, it is also a measure of
rest. Since moving or not-moving, changing or not-changing,
exhaust the possibilities for anything at all, Aristotle's view really
boils down to the one stated here: time is a measure of existence.
Commonsensically, by reference to the watch on your wrist you can
measure the existence of anything within the range of your senses
whether it moves or just sits there, e.g., that house across the
street has been there for the last 5 minutes. Even a pre-school child
knows that the answer to, "How long did that thing exist?," is always
a number of time units.
In fact, if you wished to specify the aspect of a motion which is
most fundamentally measured by time, you would have to say that time
measures how long that motion exists.
This is compatible with Ayn Rand's remarks in Introduction to
Objectivist Epistemology, Ch. 6. "The measurements omitted from
axiomatic concepts are all the measurements of all the existents they
subsume; what is retained, metaphysically, is only a fundamental fact;
what is retained, epistemologically, is only one category of
measurement, omitting its particulars: time— i.e., the
fundamental fact is retained independent of any particular moment of
awareness."
Time is a measure of existence, but nevertheless we measure time
by means of change, by means of things which come to be and pass
away, and there is a reason for this. Something which existed
unchangeably would provide no time markers for us to count, and
measurement ultimately reduces to counting.
|
Existence and simultaneity
Time is a measure of existence,
and measurement is a process carried out by human beings. Measurement
is a kind of comparison of two existents, so let's explore
comparison.
We might compare, for example, the swing of a certain pendulum with
a pulse beat, and perceive that the swing exists for as long as the
beat. That is, we perceive that the swing came to be when the
beat came to be, existed while the beat existed, and ceased to
exist when the beat ceased to exist. We can abbreviate this by
saying that the pendulum swing and the pulse beat are simultaneous.
Time is a comparison of one thing's existence to another's. The
most primitive form of this comparison is perceptual, and yields the
concept of simultaneity. Simultaneity, like existence, is directly
perceived. To perceive two things at once is to perceive them
simultaneously.
But perception of simultaneity is not yet measurement of time. We
still have not said anything about how one measures time. I.e., we
haven't yet derived time in the full sense.
|
A
standard
The existence of any one thing
could be compared to the simultaneous existence of any other. You
could compare years to human growth, pendulum swings to pulse beats,
and journeys to phases of the moon. Human age was once expressed as so
many "winters," and the phrase "many moons ago" was a cliché of movie
Westerns.
But we only arrive at the concept of time by selecting one
particular (kind of) existent, and using it to measure all the
rest. When such an existent is selected, it becomes the time
standard.
The standard is what gives time its uniqueness and universality:
without a standard, we would have many "times," many different mutual
relations between the durations of individual things. When we have a
standard, we have one time which measures them all.
Observe that no time standard exists in nature; a standard arises
from a human choice. A time standard is an existent chosen by
humans for the purpose of measuring time. Choice does not mean
arbitrary choice: as we'll soon see, the choice of a standard is far
from arbitrary. Just be aware that a standard is a contribution of
human consciousness to the concept of time.
|
Units,
arithmetic and identity: Experimenting on children
We now ask: how can we
identify all the facts implicit in our perceptions of
simultaneity in terms of a unique standard. How can we establish and
use a standard without losing any of that potential knowledge? The
answer is simple to state, easy to grasp—and goes to the heart of
(among other things) the dispute between classical and orthodox
physics.
We must establish an immutable standard. Why?
The time standard must be immutable if you are to deal with time
arithmetically; i.e., if you are to measure time. Why?
If different units of time are not equal, then no arithmetic
operations on them are valid. To so much as add or subtract times, you
must know that the units are equal. If the units are not equal, the
arithmetic results are meaningless: 5 seconds plus 2 hours equals 7
what?
In fact, 1 plus 1 does not equal 2 unless both units are the same.
If the units are not the same, arithmetic is useless. Let's explore
this.
It is proverbial that you cannot add apples to oranges, but the
fact is you can if you know exactly what you're doing. Children
know. When you ask them what is 1 apple plus 1 orange, they puzzle
over it for a moment and then triumphantly announce: 2 fruits!
And they're right! Philosophers should be so smart!
The child's thinking goes something like this. I have to add two
different things. But that doesn't make any sense; how could I
express my answer? So I have to find something the same about
them. What's the same about apples and oranges? Oh yeah, they're both
fruits! The answer is 2 fruits.
I performed this experiment on my own kids when they were very
young, and they came through like champions! By giving them units
which were progressively more and more dissimilar, I chased them up
the ladder of all the genera they knew—all the way to "thing."
The principle that you cannot add different units is fundamental.
The identification of similar units is a pre-condition of arithmetic,
without which arithmetic is invalid.
In order to so much as count you must know that the things
you are counting are similar. Without an element of similarity, you
could come up with a "sum" of sorts but it wouldn't mean anything, it
wouldn't be a sum of anything. In short, it would not be a sum
after all, and the process you went through to arrive at it would not
be counting after all.
In order to count—i.e., in order to identify a sum—one must
identify both a similarity in all the things counted, and
how many of them there are. Otherwise one's alleged sum is not a
number: it is a meaningless noise or symbol. 1 horse plus 1 cow equals
2 farm animals, but 1 horse plus 1 non-existent figment equals
contradictory nonsense.
We can look at this from a different angle. The number at which you
arrive identifies only what is similar in the things you count.
In counting you omit, or in a sense lose, all the knowledge
about all the respects in which the things which you are
counting differ. In counting apples and oranges together, you
necessarily omit all knowledge about the ways in which apples differ
from oranges, that is why you are obliged to express your result in
some such form as 2 fruits.
This may not seem to present a problem because we have a concept of
last resort: existent. 1 horse plus 1 fleeting glimpse plus 3 sonatas
plus 1 triangle equals 6 existents! But notice what has been lost
in performing this ridiculous addition: all the knowledge
about all the things which were added except for the bare fact
that they exist; it's pretty thin gruel.
The more similar the things you count, the more knowledge
of them you can retain in your result. The less similar the
things you count, the less knowledge of them you retain in your
result.
To sum up: To count is to count something. Every sum is a sum of
something. A sum identifies only what is common to all the things
counted. You must identify a unit which is common to the whole
collection of things you wish to count in order to identify
your sum. Counting, and therefore number and arithmetic in general,
rest on the law of identity.
|
Unequal
"ticks"
Now let's tackle the case of
counting unequal units of time, unequal "ticks". 1 tick of a certain
duration plus 1 later tick of a different duration equals 2 what?
The best we can do is to say 2 different periods of time. All we can
retain is the knowledge of 2 ticks, one after the other.
What is lost in adding unequal units? All knowledge of quantity
is lost. To identify quantity, we require equal units. Measurement is
an extreme of counting, it requires units which are not only similar,
but identical in the respect to be measured—i.e., they must be
equal.
It may be said that if you know the durations of two different
ticks, you can add them anyway. But this begs the point at issue,
namely how do we know durations. It pushes the problem back a
stage; it assumes that you have some other unit which is equal in both
the original units. You can add a day to an hour, but only by reducing
them both to, say, seconds. Unless you can find an identical unit, you
can neither measure nor add. Without equal units, you cannot
identify quantity.
Measurement is a very special kind of perception. To measure
something is to count up equal units of it; the units must be defined
before one can measure. Those units must be equal to one another if we
are not to lose the quantitative knowledge we seek. Therefore, our
standard of time must define equal units.
Provided we define equal units, we lose no knowledge by selecting a
single existent as a standard, and measuring everything else in terms
of it. For then we can validly apply arithmetic and re-calculate the
other ratios as needed. For example, if a certain pendulum swing is
immutable, then it can be used to measure human growth, pulse beats,
days and all the rest. The ratios of these things to one another can
all be calculated from their ratios to the duration of the pendulum
swing.
We can define a standard and measure time without letting facts
slip through our fingers if and only if our standard defines
equal units of time.
|
Clocks
and causality
How do you know
that different seconds are equal? How do you know today's second has
the same duration as the one you measured last week? For that matter,
how do you know that the duration of this second is the same as the
duration of the one before it?
The basic difficulty is that you cannot directly compare successive
time intervals. You cannot keep last week's second in a vault, and
haul it out to compare with today's second.
You compare successive time intervals by using a clock—and a
principle.
A clock is an entity which undergoes some repetitive process, which
returns to the same state at the end of each period, which is in this
sense immutable.
The principle is that the same entity in the same
state will act the same. The principle lets you infer that
because the clock keeps returning to the same state, it acts the same,
i.e., its ticks are equal.
This principle is no ad hoc assumption; it is a form of the law of
causality. In Ayn Rand's formulation, the law of causality states
that: "All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is
caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing
cannot act in contradiction to its nature." (Atlas Shrugged,
hard cover, pg. 1037) In a similar formulation, H. W. B. Joseph says,
"If one thing the same in nature at different times, or two things the
same in nature, are to act in situations the same in their nature,
they must act on both occasions in the same way." (Introduction to
Logic, Ch. XIX)
These formulations display causality as a corollary of the law of
identity. A thing acts as it does because it is the thing it is. Two
things which are the same will act the same.
It is important to grasp the full force of "same" in this law. When
we say "two entities the same" we mean the same in all
respects, not merely in all known respects. This does not imply
that we claim omniscience. On the contrary, it stands as a reminder
that we are not omniscient, that there may be unknown factors
influencing any given process.
Because things the same act the same, it follows that if two things
which are the same in all known respects nevertheless act
differently, that alone is enough to prove that in some unknown
respect they are different.
In this form, causality is immune to refutation. To refute it one
would have to claim to have found two things identically the same
which nevertheless acted differently. But only by claiming omniscience
could one claim that they were indeed the same in all
respects.
Like the law of identity itself, causality enters our reasoning
prior to any particular evidence and itself governs the interpretation
of that evidence. It is as absolutely certain as the laws of logic,
because it is a corollary of the fundamental law of logic, namely the
law of identity.
It is usually thought that prior principles such as this (prior,
that is, to any particular experiment), interfere with
discovery. But on the contrary, we see that causality directs our
attention to what is currently unknown. When we observe differing
actions of two apparently identical entities, causality tells us that
there is a difference between them. The rational response is to
inquire what that difference is, and to devise experiments to discover
it. Far from hampering research, this "pre-conceived" principle
inspires and directs it.
Notice that the appeal to causality is implicit in the methods of
time measurement actually employed; it is not some novelty
foisted upon physics by philosophy. Physicists take immense pains to
calibrate their clocks; they take for granted that identical clocks
will tick out equal seconds; philosophy merely identifies this as an
aspect of the law of causality.
|
Contextual standards
Until recently, the day and its fractions
were the time standard; the rotating Earth is a pretty good clock. It
was superseded when it was found that it wasn't precise enough for
some work. The day, it was found, varies enough to mess up very
precise measurements of time. The standard itself was in error.
This may seem puzzling. If the standard is the base of time
measurements, how is it possible to decide that the standard itself
is wrong?
Suppose the current time standard is a pendulum clock in a certain
room. All measurements of time are ultimately counted up in terms of
the ticks of this clock. But a very peculiar phenomenon is noted:
every time the temperature of the room changes, all the rest of the
universe speeds up or slows down in unison—out to the farthest
galaxies. It is a universal non-local effect, appearing everywhere
simultaneously. Clearly, either the clock or the entire rest of the
universe is changing. Which one? We would soon conclude that there's
something wrong with the clock, but what is the principle to which we
would appeal to justify this conclusion?
The answer, once again, is causality. There is nothing which
changes all the rest of the universe simultaneously, but there is a
change known to affect the clock, namely its temperature change. We
happen to know that the period of a pendulum depends on its length,
and that its length varies with temperature. Therefore the rate at
which a pendulum clock runs varies with temperature. The "same"
pendulum clock at a different temperature is a different
clock.
Even a physicist who did not know the effect of temperature on a
pendulum clock could validly conclude that there is something
connected with temperature which is messing up the clock—that there is
some real effect altering the clock's action, that the clock is in
some way different when it is at different temperatures.
We can push this a step further. Even a physicist who was entirely
ignorant of temperature could still conclude that something was
altering the clock's action. In principle, this could even be a way to
discover the fact of temperature. The alternative to deducing
that an unknown real effect was altering the action of the clock would
be to embrace a host of absurdities, such as the non-local effects
mentioned earlier.
A universal non-local effect is one which appears everywhere
simultaneously. It would have to be mediated by a process which exists
for no time at all. But whatever exists for no time at all does not
exist. Non-locality is absurd in the full logical meaning of
absurd.
Furthermore, evidence would pile up that similar clocks made of
different materials, or in different rooms, would produce different
anomalies. Entirely different kinds of clocks, such as a quartz
wristwatch, would have no anomalies or at least different ones.
In light of all this, those determined to stick with the old
standard would be faced with a culminating absurdity. They would have
to claim that this particular clock, which they choose as a
standard, governs every process in the universe, sometimes speeding
them up and sometimes slowing them down.
But if what they choose as a standard governs the universe, then
their choice governs the universe. Thus, the alternative to
acknowledging that an unknown real effect is changing the clock would
be to suppose that their consciousness governs the course of
the universe. The name for this particular absurdity is the primacy of
consciousness, and it involves denials of identity and causality.
Time rests on causality. It is only by reference to causality that
we can select a standard, and measure time at all. It is only by
reference to causality that we can decide whether an old standard may
or must be abandoned in the light of new evidence. A given time
standard is only valid within a certain context of our knowledge, and
may have to be modified or replaced as our knowledge increases.
|
Non-contextual standard?
Is a non-contextual standard
of time—an absolutely absolute standard—possible? Can there be a clock
the ticks of which could forever be taken as equal, with no
corrections whatever, and in all circumstances whatever? I don't think
so.
In the first place, to claim to have found such a standard would be
to claim omniscience. Such a claim would have to be prefaced by some
such statement as: "I have reviewed all the causal influences
in the universe, and have proved that none of them can ever, for all
time to come, affect the rate of this clock." I think it unlikely that
anyone will ever be able to validly make such a claim. No one now is
entitled to do so.
In the second place, consider the kind of clock which would have to
underlie such a time standard. It would have to be truly eternal,
absolutely unaffected by anything whatever, returning to identically
the same state, again and again through all eternity. Before you start
suggesting candidate eternal clocks, recall that the ancients thought
they had one in the rotation of the heavens about the Earth. They had
a lot to learn; so, perhaps, do we.
A non-contextual time standard would not only be hard to establish,
it would be useless for discovery. Before such a standard could be
established, i.e., before it could be proved to be non-contextual,
physics would have to be essentially complete, and provably so. This
is implied by the omniscience claim mentioned above. Thus, such a
standard could only be established after all the interesting
facts had been discovered, not as an aid to such discovery.
We do not have a non-contextual time standard, nor do we need one.
All we have, and all we need, is a contextual physical standard, and
the law of causality.
To define time at all we must appeal to causality. Causality
enables us to monitor the validity of our standard—and to amend it as
necessary in light of new knowledge. |
Can time
speed up?
As early as the time of Aristotle,
people were asking whether time itself could change its rate.
Aristotle's answer was that time is what we use to measure rates, so
that it is absurd to suppose that time can speed up or slow down.
We can expand a bit on his answer. Our time measurements are made
in terms of a standard clock, which was chosen precisely for its
immutability, so that all its ticks are equal. If evidence is found
that something is making the ticks unequal, we must either replace the
standard or apply corrections to it. In order to measure time,
the rate of the standard clock must not change.
The basic reply to the suggestion that time might change its rate
is that time itself is not a rate, and does not have a rate. Only
changes have rates, and time is not a change. Despite Newton's
unfortunate metaphor comparing time to a river, time does not flow.
Time is not a change, nor can time change. The concepts of "change,"
and "rate" are simply not applicable to time. If time changed it would
not be time; time is not the kind of thing that can change.
Then what the heck is it?
Time is existence, measured
by means of a clock, which was chosen for its immutability
and validated by reference to causality.
This formal definition rests on, and condenses, this theory of
time. The emphasized terms point out the highlights. Existence is what
we measure by time. Measurement is the human process by which we
identify time. A clock is the physical instrument of time measurement.
The clock's immutability is a logical pre-condition of time
measurement. Its immutability is validated by the principle of
causality.
Observe that every item in this definition is essential to
time. Drop any of them, and the concept evaporates.
But observe also that all the complexity of the definition
arises from spelling out the essentials of measurement. It is probably
necessary to spell them out because there are so many theories which
mangle them; but if we can take measurement as already understood, we
get back to the simplicity we started with: namely, time is a measure
of existence.
So, can time change? To put it bluntly, time cannot change
because we must not let it! Some may think that this implies
assuming a godlike power over reality, but it simply reflects the fact
that in measuring anything we must choose immutable units. It implies
refusing to accept two seconds as equal if we know that the clock we
are using was subject to different causal influences in the two cases.
It implies refusing to falsify our knowledge.
To suggest that time can change is analogous to suggesting that
number can change. We accept without hesitation that if we put four
rabbits on an island, the number of rabbits there can change, can
become eight rabbits or no rabbits. We rightly regard it as absurd to
suppose that four can become eight or zero! Similarly, there is
no problem in accepting that any given process can change its rate,
but to suggest that time can change is absurd.
The meaning of time and number rest on immutability. If we allowed
"four" to change, it would invalidate every calculation in which it
appeared. If we allow "time" to change, it invalidates every equation
in which it appears.
|
Simultaneity at a distance
On the basis of this theory of time,
we can define simultaneity at a distance without recourse to
derivative concepts such as velocity.
Distant simultaneity is defined by the transport of clocks, and is
validated by yet another appeal to causality: the same clock
will act the same in different places. The validation of
a mobile standard proceeds in essentially the same manner as
validation of any other time standard.
It is interesting to note that transport of a clock is exactly the
method which was used by Captain Cook to carry Greenwich time all over
the globe, and to map it. Until accurate mobile clocks were invented,
the determination of longitude was very difficult. But by determining
Greenwich time on the far side of the globe, navigators were able to
determine that their astronomical observations were simultaneous
to certain corresponding observations at Greenwich. It was then a
straightforward exercise in geometry to determine their longitude.
Accurate mobile clocks preceded the mapping of the Earth, by
determining simultaneity at a distance.
|
Absolute
time
On the above principles, we
can validly imagine sequences of standard clocks in different places,
issuing their uniform ticks from everlasting unto everlasting. The
ticks are all equal, every duration is measured by them, every event
falls between some two of them.
Time is universal, unique, and eternally uniform. We know it is
because that's the way we made it. We had to make it that way in order
to apply arithmetic; in order for our time units to possess identity.
If we made it non-universal, non-unique or non-uniform, we would be
fudging our units, and so would be unable to retain in our theories
all the facts implicit in our perceptions.
This validates absolute time, what is often called Newtonian time.
Absolute time's anchor to reality is the law of causality, a
corollary of the law of identity, the basic law of logic. As such, it
is immune to experimental refutation.
|
"Time
dilation" and experiment
It is often claimed that
Einstein's notion of "time dilation" is confirmed by experiments which
show moving clocks running slow, but this is not true. The experiments
actually confirm a very different proposition, to wit that some
moving clocks run slow!
Certain kinds of clocks moving in aircraft or in Earth satellites
run more slowly than the same kinds of clocks stationary on the
surface of the Earth, and they slow down by an amount which depends on
their fraction of light speed. Don't filter the facts through the
theory of time dilation; just count the ticks! Those clocks
really run slower.
From causality, we conclude that the moving clocks are
different in some respect from Earth-bound clocks, that something
makes a difference in their actions. Since that difference depends
on their motion, they are moving relative to something real.
Let us call it vacuum, or, if you prefer, ether.
Once we disperse the fog of time dilation, this establishes the
existence of a real vacuum.
Recall that it was the failure of the Michelson-Morley experiment
to find convincing evidence for an ether which emboldened Einstein to
decry ether as a metaphysical figment, and to develop his notion of
time dilation. Now, evidence which clinches the case for real vacuum
is taken as evidence for time dilation!
This illustrates the principle that causality and absolute time are
tools of discovery; theorists who have abandoned them are unable to
interpret the evidence of those clocks. But their theories are wrong,
time is absolute, and something is slowing those clocks. I
wonder what.
|
Conclusion
Time is a measure of each individual
thing in the same way that length is a measure of each
individual long thing. Therefore time offers a starting point for the
quantitative study of anything whatever. We measure time by counting
the ticks of clocks, and must validate our clocks by reference to
causality. Indeed, discrepant time measurements may be our first
evidence that we are dealing with unknown causal factors. To dismiss
such discrepancies with claims that time itself can "dilate" is to
ignore that evidence.
|
Acknowledgments
First: Aristotle, who crafted
what is essentially our modern concept of time in the 4th century BC (Physica,
Bk. IV). It lay scientifically dormant until Galileo used his pulse to
measure pendulum swings, and went on to use pendulum swings to
establish the laws of falling bodies.
Second: Ayn Rand, who
explicitly connected time to the axioms of existence, consciousness
and identity.
Third: Petr Beckmann, who woke
me with the radical hypothesis that time doesn't dilate, that certain
clocks do slow down. (Einstein
Plus Two) |
(C) 1997, Michael Miller.
Michael Miller is an engineer and
Objectivist filosofer with thirty years of experience. He had been a
member of Boycott Alberta Medicare in 1969 and of the Association to
Defend Property Rights from 1973 on. He writes in-depth philosophical
theory at his publication, Quackgrass Press, which can be accessed at
http://www.quackgrass.com.
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