A Rational Cosmology
Change and Time
G. Stolyarov II
A Journal for Western Man-- Issue XLI-- September 16, 2005
Note: This essay is the fourth chapter of Mr. Stolyarov's new comprehensive filosofical treatise, A Rational Cosmology, explicating such terms as the universe, matter, space, time, sound, light, life, consciousness, and volition, which can be ordered in electronic format for only $2.50 at http://www.lulu.com/content/140855. Free previews, descriptions, and information on A Rational Cosmology can be found at http://rationalargumentator.com/rc.html.
The three spatial dimensions suffice in describing the constituents of a universe that are, in their entirety, absolutely static, and have not even a potentiality of being altered in their qualities. A universe of entities exhibiting only mass, volume, length, width, and height would be a universe that subsumes only entities, qualities, and static relationships of position, which would remain constant in perpetuity and admit no effect of any entity upon any other. Ubiquitous observation, however, informs us that, in the actual universe, such effects are made manifest unceasingly. The vast majority of actual relationships, the reader will recall, are interactions between two or more entities that affect some change in those entities’ qualities. We note that A=A, and a certain magnitude equals that magnitude, and no other. Then, how do we account for the fact that the same dog, for example, may have mass X, and, upon eating a dog treat, increase its mass to X+1? The fact that things are what they are cannot be denied or disproved. Thus, we must search for the answer within the framework of the axioms of existence and identity.
By the axiom of identity, it becomes self-evident that no entity can exhibit simultaneously different magnitudes of the same quality. Yet it is also self-evident, through ubiquitous observation, that a given entity can and most often does exhibit different magnitudes of the same quality. Thus, we are left to conclude that these magnitudes, to be mutually inclusive within an entity, must be non-simultaneous. To be non-simultaneous, they must be separated in some manner. This manner in which non-simultaneous measurements of the same quality in the same entity are separated is change.
The “separation” implied in the concept of change is not exclusively spatial, though, in almost every conceivable example, there is a spatial component to it. For example, a sfere to which another entity of some mass is added thereby also becomes more voluminous. Nevertheless, to describe the sfere’s transformation in terms of the three spatial dimensions alone would be insufficient. One would be left with the contradiction of having a sfere of mass X and that same sfere of mass X+1 occupying the same spatial position simultaneously! These two states of the same sfere must be separated by some other dimension, a dimension that can be called time. It is separation through time, or temporal separation, that makes change possible and accounts for the ubiquitous observation of the same entities having different magnitudes of the same qualities.
Any change is inevitably a relationship between some multiplicity of entities, since no homogeneous entity can affect a change in its own qualities, and the changes in the qualities of a heterogeneous entity can always be explained via the interactions of the entities that compose it (since a heterogeneous entity consists of smaller entities by definition). Time is that quality of an entity whose measurements increase as change occurs. It should be noted that the change that must occur in order for the measurement of the quality, “time” to increase is not the change of any particular entity, but any change whatsoever. As a matter of fact, so long as the very possibility of change exists as an interaction between as few as two entities in the entire universe, the concept of time retains meaning, and each entity’s particular measurement of the quality, “time” must necessarily increase. This proposition will be examined in greater detail as the basis for a universal and uniform time scale.
Time can be called a quality of entities, because it can be exhibited by particular entities only. There is no such thing as time. Time is not a factor of some “cosmic fabric” separate from entities. Rather, just as each entity must have a spatial existence, so must it have a temporal existence that is measurable. An entity’s age since the first moment of its existence is the measurement of the quality, ”time,” exhibited by that entity. An entity’s age can only increase and never decrease, even if a given change that had occurred with respect to it has been undone precisely. For example, an entity with shape A at age X could have its shape transformed to B at age X+1, and then could return shape A at age X+2. This would not reduce the entity’s age to X, however, because an entity that experiences a change, and then experiences an inverse change, does not un-experience either of the changes. There is no fysical mechanism that can arise after the occurrence of an event and obliterate the occurrence. The transformation from A to B happened, otherwise the transformation from B to A could not have nullified its effects. If the transformation from B to A were capable of wiping out of history the former transformation from A to B, then it would follow that, the original change not having existed, there could also not have been a change to reverse a non-existent change. Thus, the change assumed to “obliterate” a past event would thereby also obliterate itself and not exist. Thus is evident the impossibility of changing the course of a past event, since whatever would change the past would also need to not exist, and thus would not be able to change the past.
Since it is impossible for any event to change the past, no entity can have the same age at a given instant in time as it did at some other temporal instant. Since the process of change is, by definition, one of change taking place, rather than annihilating the fact that it had taken place, the latter of which is impossible, any measurement pertaining to change must be positive. Since the sum total of all changes (including mutually antagonistic changes) that have ever occurred can only accumulate, time, the quality of entities that renders change possible must, too, possess positive increments and constantly accumulate in its magnitude within every entity.
Though the three spatial dimensions have the ability to increase or decrease in their magnitude within any given entity, the fourth dimension, time, can only increase in its magnitude. The reason why time is, too, a dimension, though not a spatial one, is the impossibility of relating any two real entities without describing some involvement of the quality, “time.” Even if we consider two sferes frozen at some set distance apart, we must still make mention of the fact that the two sferes are in such a position simultaneously, recognizing that the sferes’ relationship was not merely a part of each sfere’s bygone history, nor is it only possible as the sferes accumulate age (i.e. in the future). We merely admit that there is some dimension (time) which is mentally held constant for the purposes of the present examination, as we are only observing the relationship of the sferes in one particular moment, as we had, in Chapter III, observed the relationship of real, three-dimensional boxes in only one dimension. Were such sferes to exist, there would be no way to hold the fourth dimension constant except as a mental model! The three-dimensional boxes did not become one-dimensional simply because man used a Euclidean one-dimensional line to accurately express their relative position in terms of only the dimension, width. Likewise, sferes with an existence in three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension do not cease existing in the temporal dimension merely because the factor of time is beyond the scope of somebody’s present observation of the sferes. In the real world, while man performs an analysis of what the sferes’ spatial relationship was when the sferes each had some given age, the sferes’ age continues to increase, uniformly, as the very investigation is conducted!
A Time Scale
In Chapter III, the necessity of a universal coordinate system for relating the positions of all entities to the positions of all other entities was made explicit. This coordinate system’s applicability was derived from the fact that entities can (and most often do) have varying degrees of spatial separation based on three mutually independent parameters. It can similarly be claimed, through logic and ubiquitous observation, that entities can (and most often do) have varying degrees of temporal separation based on one parameter. For example, the temporal separation between George Washington and G. Stolyarov II is of a lesser degree than that between Julius Caesar and G. Stolyarov II. Two entities need not be temporally separate, and it is conceivable (though improbable) that a given entity’s span of existence may match perfectly that of another entity. (As a matter of fact, in order to be distinct, two entities need only differ along one spatial dimension, as the Chapter III example of a possible linear relationship between two distinct boxes demonstrates.) However, the fact that some entities are temporally separate necessitates the existence of a scale to relate their magnitudes of separation. Just as a spatial coordinate system can relate all entities that presently exist in three dimensions, a time scale can relate all entities that ever existed in one dimension.
It must be recalled here that the measurement of time can only increase, and each entity may only have one age at any given instant. This implies that time is indeed a single dimension rather than a multiplicity of them, and can only be measured in terms of one parameter, thus necessitating a linear time scale. This instantly refutes the common error of Oriental thought systems, which had proposed time to follow a cyclical progression. A cyclical progression, however, implies that the time scale would be circular, not linear, and a circle (or an ellipse, or any other closed curved shape on a planar surface) can only be depicted in terms of two dimensions. Since time is expressible only by one parameter, and since 1 ≠ 2, the time scale can only be depicted linearly.
A spatial coordinate system, in order to accurately depict the positional relationships between all entities and take into account their varying degrees of separation, must exhibit uniform units. Any scale that is designed to represent inter-entity relationships must similarly be absolutely uniform, even though the span designated a unit on the scale is selected arbitrarily. Thus, a time scale, to have any purpose or meaning, must by definition be uniform. A year is a year is a year, no matter what happens to any particular entity during that year. Thus, though time is a ubiquitous quality of particular entities, it is not a quality that depends on the fluctuations of other such ubiquitous qualities. The measurement of the quality, “time,” within an entity, i.e. that entity’s age, continues to increase so long as the entity has some measure of the other ubiquitous qualities. That is, just so long as a given entity has some quantity of mass, volume, and the three spatial dimensions, it will exhibit the quality, “time.” But the degree to which it exhibits time, its age, does not vary in accordance with the quantitative fluctuations of any other qualities, even ubiquitous ones, the entity has. Each existing entity accumulates age in the same manner and at the same rate (rate itself being a function of time). This insight can be concisely frased for future word economy: time is an absolute quality.
Let us assume, for a moment, that the contrary notion, that of relative time, were to be employed. By relative time, we shall describe the idea that the accumulation of the quality, “time,” varies from entity to entity. The form of the scenario on which the theory of relative time inherently relies can be expressed thus: We begin our observation of entity A and entity B simultaneously. During the period of observation, while entity A has accumulated X units of time, it is possible for entity B to have accumulated Y units of time, where Y ≠ X. The perceptive reader will note that the above statement is a contradiction in terms. The frase, “During the period of observation…” begs the question: “A period, based on what?” The self-evident answer is that the period of observation is a certain period of time. Without the concept of time, the concept of “period” would have no significance; a period is a certain span of time for which there is reason to perceive it as noteworthy. Thus, the scenario on which all notions of “relative time” are based essentially states, “During the same period of time, entity A can accumulate more/less time than entity B.” This means that at least one of these entities would need to accumulate more/less time than it actually accumulates! Whenever one blatantly exposes a proposition as implying that A ≠ A, one knows that one has identified a fundamental logical error.
This implies, of course, a fundamental logical error at the core of the very foundation of post-Classical fysics, namely, Einsteinian Relativity, which holds that the accumulation of time depends on the location and state of the observer. A rejection of the conceptual core of Relativity does not, however, automatically imply a rejection of what valid observations Einstein’s scientific framework may have implied. One such (hypothetical) observation may be that astronauts in a spaceship that flies at extremely high speeds are not susceptible to the processes of bodily decay in as small an amount of time as those individuals who remain on Earth. It may also be true that these astronauts’ organisms’ capacity to react to their environment (and perceive their environment) during a longer period of time will be roughly equal to the Earth-dwellers’ reaction and perception capacities during a shorter period of time. In other words, the individual alterations of non-temporal qualities of particular entities may conceivably be in accord with Einstein’s propositions, as is the task of experimental fysics to verify. But giving Einstein credit here does not excuse the error at the core of his theory, namely, the proposition that time itself is somehow relative to the observer. Neither the degree of a man’s senescence nor the level of activity with which his brain responds to the environment around him is inherently bound to the passage of particular time intervals. The above two processes are relationships and thus, in order to occur, must occur within some amount of time, but there is no universal restriction that states that a man born in 1980 will have gray hair, wrinkles, and poor vision in 2060. That is, the opposite scenario is conceivable, even if it is not encountered due to the peculiar technological deficiencies of our era.
Being eighty-years-old does not necessarily mean being senescent, and a thirty-year-old astronaut sent at near-light speeds into space in 2010 will not return in 2060 being thirty-years-old; he will be eighty-years-old, though his bodily form will be more typically encountered among thirty-year-olds than eighty-year-olds. Though his biological functions will be less impaired by the passage of time than those of Earth-dwellers, he will still have accumulated the same age between 2010 and 2060 as someone who had remained on Earth during that time. To oppose this fact is to espouse the logical error of “relative time,” which is not even necessary to support the possibility of the validity of some of the empirical implications of Einstein’s theory. Because I have explained the scenario of the astronaut’s presence at near-light speeds without referring to the “relativity” of time, it follows that, by Occam’s Razor, the concept of relative time is superfluous to Einstein’s model, at least in this scenario. Einstein would have performed marvelously and yielded insights of remarkable accuracy if he, in the capacity of a fysicist, had stayed within the bounds of fysics, a specific-observational science, and not ventured to make generalizations which properly pertain to cosmology, a field of metafysics and the rightful province of filosofy.
The popular use of the words “old” and “age” may have, thus far, impeded some readers’ understanding of the ideas in this chapter. Thus, it is fitting to dispel certain undue equivocations employed in mainstream culture regarding these terms. Let the reader recall that filosofy rightfully belongs to the realm of science, though it is a foundational rather than a specific-observational science. Thus, the terms employed within a filosofical treatise must each refer to one concept and one concept only, making distinctions between different cultural uses of the same word and correcting them by giving one of the uses a different name.
“Age” and “aging” are often used in the mainstream culture to refer to senescence, or the progressive decay of bodily mechanisms. The same words can also be used in the manner hitherto employed in this treatise, to describe the measurement of the quality, “time,” accumulated by an entity. However, aging and senescence are in fact two distinct fenomena that happen to correlate in human beings, some of whose internal functions deteriorate over time. One of these is purely an issue of the accumulation of numerical age, the other, a deleterious alteration in some of the fysical qualities of cells, organs, and tissues. The mainstream culture has committed the error of considering the two fenomena one and the same, and becoming “old” has become synonymous with becoming feeble and incapacitated. A real consequence of this is a widespread perception in the modern culture that senescence is a necessary part of the natural order, and cannot be cured or reversed. According to this mindset, it is inconceivable for an eighty-year-old to have the robustness and vitality of a fysically sound adult, and the very idea of a future procurement of indefinite longevity is scarcely allowed by this confusion of terminology. Just as the conceptual errors of modern science ultimately reduce to the crippling notion that “we can never fully understand the secrets of the universe,” so does this conflation of terms ultimately reduce to the paralyzing superstition that man must somehow be permanently enslaved by the forces of death and decay.
Moreover, the false equation of the terms “numerically old” and “senescent” has rendered Einstein’s idea of the “relativity of time” attractive in the general culture, as, according to this confusion, a fysically robust astronaut who has traveled at near-light-speeds for 50 years cannot possibly be considered “old”! Rather than recognizing every particular entity as accumulating age uniformly, as happens in reality, the relativists either render the concept of time meaningless by treating the spans defined by its units as entirely open to fluctuation, or elevate time to the status of some mystical entity-in-itself, which is what must have changed if human qualities did not behave as predicted during some interval of it. The latter is tantamount to a senescing man claiming that, because he had shrunk in height over the past years, all of space is relative, and it was in fact the entity, “space,” which had grown!
Entities may change in their qualities, but units of measurement must ever remain uniform, if qualities and changes therein can ever be gauged in any meaningful manner.
Time cannot have a beginning or end.
This follows from the fact that time is not an entity. Whereas each entity must have a temporal origin in order to, at any given instant, exhibit a finite measurement of the quality, time, it is senseless to speak of the temporal origin of any ”pure quality,” for qualities cannot exist apart from the entities that exhibit them. The only legitimate statement that can be made regarding the “origin of a quality” in fact pertains to the origin of the first entity exhibiting such a quality. In loose terms, it may be fitting to refer to a certain “chronological origin of life,” since life is an emergent quality built upon a variety of more rudimentary qualities and relationships, and the entities exhibiting these qualities and relationships first combined to bring about the emergent quality, “life,” some 3.1 billion years ago. Any quality that derives itself from some more basic qualities and relationships (always, in each instance, provided by the entities directly exhibiting them), could have an origin in time, though it is not known whether every emergent quality has such an origin. (For example, the question of whether or not any historical entity exhibiting the color red was the first entity to do so has not yet been resolved.) But ubiquitous qualities, such as mass, volume, the spatial dimensions, and time, cannot have had any beginning, for all entities must exhibit them, and no entity can lay claim to the distinction of having been the first to do so.
The universe is the totality of all entities that exist. Since, as we have proved in Chapter II, the universe can have neither a beginning nor an end, it must be that the universe has always existed. By this, we mean that a totality of entities has always existed, but such a totality cannot exist without the existence of some entities, the entities which happen to compose it. Thus, the eternal existence of the universe in effect implies that, at any moment to which one chooses to refer to on a time scale, some entities could be found that existed during that moment. These entities were not necessarily the same entities that exist today, or will exist at some moment in the future. Nevertheless, it was the interaction of past entities that gave rise to present entities, and it is the interaction of present entities that will give rise to future entities.
Entities cannot arise in any other manner except through some relationships among other entities. To claim anything else would be either to concede that there are such things as “pure qualities” outside of entities that give rise to entities, or to hold that entities could originate spontaneously, ex nihilo. The former notion has already been refuted, and the latter claims, at its root, that A ≠ A. Such a scenario would propose that, at one instant, an entity has zero measurements of every quality, i.e., that the entity does not exist, then, at the next instant, some of its qualities suddenly have measurements of nonzero magnitudes. Where did they get these increased quantities of qualities? Why, nowhere, of course! This leads to two possibilities, the first being that 0 ≠ 0, since zero equals a series of nonzero numbers which represent the measurements of the qualities of the spontaneously generated entity, for, if that entity did not get those quantities from any other entity, it must have gotten them from itself, i.e., always had them. This is, of course, an outright concession of logical error. The second possible implication of the theory of spontaneous generation is that the entity actually did get the new nonzero quantities of its qualities from nowhere, i.e. did not get them. Under this implication, the entity that did not get any qualities cannot possibly exist! To speak of an entity without qualities is in violation of the first ontological corollary, which states that an entity is the sum of its qualities.
We have thus proved that all entities are originated by other entities, that the universe always contained some sorts of entities, and that all entities have certain ubiquitous qualities, including time. This clearly implies that the quality, “time,” cannot have an origin, because no entity could ever conceivably be called the first entity with that quality. (Moreover, these insights imply that no entity could ever conceivably be called the first entity to exist, period.)
By similar logic, because the universe cannot have an end, neither can there ever be an end to entities altogether, nor any entity that could be deemed the “last entity in existence.” Because time is a ubiquitous quality of entities, it will follow that there will always exist entities that exhibit the quality, time. Thus, time can never end. When devising a mathematical model for our proposed time scale, we then can firmly assert that such a scale will assume the form of a Euclidean line, that is, a one-dimensional tool with an unending expanse in both directions. Individual entities can only “move” in one direction on that scale, i.e., the direction of increasing magnitude. However, we are able to mentally compare entities that lie in either direction on the scale. This is integral to the human understanding of entities, their histories, and their possible futures, but this understanding cannot alter the constant, uniform, and unceasing accumulation of the quality, “time” within every entity.
A universe where time is not necessary is inconceivable.
It has already been demonstrated that, whenever the magnitude of some quality of some entity is altered, explaining such changes in the absence of a time scale is impossible. However, it shall also be shown here that, even were all the entities in the universe to enter a period of absolute stasis, they would continue to accumulate the quality, time, uniformly, and their relation via a time scale would remain inescapably necessary.
Let us presume that two entities, A and B, enter absolute stasis (say, by coming to exhibit an absolute zero temperature by some means) simultaneously. Even now we see the need to relate them by a time scale, since we would observe a far different fenomenon had A and B not become static simultaneously, that is, had A experienced changes in its qualities while B experienced none, or vice versa. However, one might ask, would one need a time scale to relate A and B after the instant at which they had become static? After all, their qualities would not change by definition after said instant. Yet, we know from simple observation of the fenomena around us, that stasis is not the only condition accessible to an entity. As a matter of fact, we have yet to observe a truly static entity in every respect. Thus, we may assert knowledge of the fact that A and B do not have to remain static once they become static; some set of future circumstances is possible that would render them dynamic entities (i.e. entities with some changing qualities).
However, if this possibility exists, it also implies that A and B can become dynamic simultaneously, or at varying times, with A remaining static while B resumes a changing mode, or vice versa. Even from the nature of the above statement, it is self-evident that an investigation into which of these conditions takes place can only be performed with the aid of a uniform time scale. If A remains static for X units of time, while B remains static for X+1 units of time, only a time scale can account for the difference of 1 unit, and only a uniform time scale can ensure that our tools used to relate the behavior of real entities do not equate X units with X+1 of the same units, nor with π of the same units, for that matter, nor with any arbitrary number of units that a relativistic time scale inherently renders one susceptible to.
If the above reasoning is true of any two entities, A and B, it, if extended to a larger amount of entities, or, indeed, to the totality of the entities which are the universe, must remain true, for a larger multitude of entities will still have the potentiality of entering or leaving stasis simultaneously, or at variance with one another. It is theoretically feasible (though practically never observed) for no thing to experience any change in its qualities for some period of time, but it will matter for an accurate explanation of that fenomenon whether the stasis lasts a second, a year, or a trillion years. It is true that, during that period of stasis, no observer would be able to make such a measurement, since an observer is also part of the universe and would, consequently, also be static in such a case. However, humans have often had need to refer to time periods which they had never personally experienced, from the time of the formation of the solar system, to the era of the dinosaurs, to the history of prior generations. The human mind, as an accurate judge of reality, possesses ability to accurately relate measurements of the quality, time, in entities, no matter how far removed these measurements may be from the mind’s own accumulation of the quality, time, i.e., the duration of its individual existence.
A truly uniform time scale does not depend on fysical fenomena.
Some will object to the above reasoning by stating that our very ability to have a time scale depends on the dynamic nature of certain specific entities, our days owing their existence to the rotation of the Earth, our years—to its revolution around the Sun, our months—to the cycles of the Moon. These thinkers would argue that, were the aforementioned entities to enter a period of stasis, our entire time scale would collapse, since they could no longer be used as reference points. Such an argument, however, is flawed in a multitude of ways.
First, it is fitting to note that certain of our units on a time scale have absolutely no relevance to the behavior of external entities. No celestial cycle occurs during a period of precisely seven days, for example, yet we maintain the keeping of weeks as essential units around which our time scale is organized. No external fenomenon necessitates a week to be seven days. A ten-day week was, for example, tried during the French Revolution. No external fenomenon requires a day to be split into twenty-four hours, or an hour into sixty minutes, or a minute into sixty seconds—all inventions of the Babylonians. These are arbitrary divisions, and, excepting a given individual’s familiarity with and thus preference of one system over another, the accuracy of an individual’s analysis of the temporal behavior of entities would not differ had the divisions been undertaken differently.
My claim is not meant to critique the correspondence of a time scale with fysical fenomena, which may be useful for anticipating cyclical weather trends or coordinating one’s daily plans with the availability of sunlight. However, correspondence and dependence are two different relationships entirely. Were the Earth’s period of rotation about the Sun to increase by a second, for example, “altering” the length of the year to fit this change would be absurd, as, it would imply that, in reference to our time scale, the Earth’s period would not have changed at all, since it would still, via this adjustment, take a year for the Earth to orbit the Sun! This would imply an overt evasion of an actual event that had taken place. It is not reality that must be adjusted to our systems, but rather our systems adjusted to reality, and, if the Sun’s period did, in reality, increase, our system would need to accommodate the fact that the period would now be a year and one second rather than merely a year. Of course, we would be at leisure to invent a new interval on our time scale that would correspond to the new period of the Sun’s rotation, but, relative to a year, such an interval would always be one second longer. It should be remembered that, to be an accurate measurement of real fenomena, a time scale can include units of any magnitude and any relationship of one unit’s magnitude to another’s. A day can be equivalent to 24 hours, or 86,400 seconds, or 3πe-4 of some conceivable unit X of time that somebody might choose to invent for some purpose. However, the requirement of uniformity on a time scale implies a proportionality of every given time unit to every other time unit. Two days, must, therefore, be equivalent to 48 hours, 172,800 seconds, or 6πe-4 of unit X.
Similarly, so long as a time scale adheres to the requirement of uniformity, it does not matter which location on the time spectrum (which, again, is a part of a mental model, not any actual point on a real entity) is the time scale’s “zero point,” or the temporal arrangement of entities to which the scale relates all future configurations with a positive magnitude of a unit and all past configurations with a negative magnitude. The “zero point” may well be the birth of Christ, or the founding of the French Republic, or the time at which George Washington signed the United States Constitution.
Nor is it necessary to have only a single “zero point” to which all other events are always related. For example, when I state that I had written a poem “a day before yesterday,” I am using yesterday, not the birth of Christ, as the “zero point” of the time scale which I presently happen to be employing. This time scale is perfectly consistent with the one describing the Christian Era, as is evident by the faultless nature of the suggestion that I had written the poem “a day before yesterday, on January 20, 2005,” since there exists a uniformity of and proportionality among all the units used, in this case, days and years. As a matter of fact, whenever we introduce a multiplicity of different time units into our consideration, we employ a combination of different time scales by definition, with the scale of seconds having different intervals from the scale of days having different intervals from the scale of millennia. These scales need not rule each other out; they are different instruments at our disposal for different tasks. Much as a meter-stick would be useful for measuring one object’s length, while the length of another could better be determined by a satellite electronically recording distances of hundreds of kilometers, so are different time scales suited for different purposes, but always within the same absolute reality, describing non-contradictory qualities involving real entities.
Since no particular fysical fenomenon is inextricably necessary for the keeping of a time scale, it is possible for us to conceive a condition of hypothetical universal stasis in which a time scale could still be kept and would be of necessity in describing the conditions pertaining to entities in such a state. We would not be able to think about time scales while in stasis ourselves, since our thinking is in itself an act that involves the change in some qualities of some, indeed, many entities. However, we presently can grasp soundly and with certainty that the quality, time, accumulates uniformly for all entities, in all conditions, in all environments.
G. Stolyarov II is a science fiction novelist, independent filosofical essayist, poet, amateur mathematician and composer, contributor to organizations such as Le Quebecois Libre, Enter Stage Right, the Autonomist, and The Liberal Institute. Mr. Stolyarov is the Editor-in-Chief of The Rational Argumentator. He can be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org.
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