In his lecture, “Soft Despotism: Democracy’s Drift,” Dr. Paul Rahe extensively analyzed the nuances of Montesquieu’s view of the English political society and national character. One of the ideas Dr. Rahe attributes to Montesquieu is that of a prevailing sense of “uneasiness” among the 18^th-century English; the English have political liberty and the rule of law, but many of them do not feel secure despite possessing actual security. This insecurity, according to Dr. Rahe, renders a republic based on the English model vulnerable to the emergence of despotism as a byproduct of the people’s search for stability and security.

          I asked Dr. Rahe if this sense of “uneasiness” could be more positively channeled in other directions than the political. I used the example of the Industrial Revolution—which began in Britain during the 1770s, several decades after Montesquieu’s death—to illustrate my point. Uneasiness about one’s present conditions is a prerequisite for attempts to improve them through invention, commercial innovation, and the acquisition of wealth. Dr. Rahe agreed that such uneasiness fuels the spirit of commerce and free markets, but he also commented on a reverse tendency—that of the market to generate insecurity. Once an entrepreneur has achieved a position of wealth and security on the market, he must guard it against further innovations that might render his methods of production obsolete or displace him via more efficient competition. This is why, according to Dr. Rahe, the same entrepreneurs who made their fortunes on the free market often lobby for government restrictions on free enterprise—to protect them from further perceived insecurity.

          While it is true that, historically, many government economic regulations have been lobbied for by special business interests, I do not think it necessarily follows that free markets have a tendency to foster restrictions on free markets. There are several factors that can counteract this effect.

          First, widespread competition might itself prevent the institution of government regulations by inhibiting the emergence of any one economic interest powerful enough to lobby for such regulations. Madison’s argument that factions can be controlled through their multiplication might apply to the economic arena as well. Where there is vigorous business competition and no one party has enough resources to force a change in the political environment, one of the competing parties will not be able to lobby and convince politicians to stifle the others. It would likely be less expensive to compete fairly and non-coercively on the free market rather than to expend time and resources to make a political effort while one’s competitors have a similar number of resources available for commercial activities.

          Second, a change in the general attitude toward life on the part of entrepreneurs and the public might foster freer markets. It is imperative that people cease to consider security, prosperity, and happiness as static states—as plateaus to be reached beyond which further improvement is unnecessary. Rather, these goals ought to be considered dynamically—as objects of indefinite accumulation, no present quantity of which is sufficient. Rather than having “uneasiness” be considered a temporary evil to be removed by government force, it should be considered the normal and desirable state of human life; it should not be treated with frustration and despair, but rather with joy at the prospect of opportunities for one’s own expansion into greater realms and activities. From the standpoint of the entrepreneur, having invented one brilliant production technique does not justify his further stagnation or simple continuance in the implementation of that technique. In the words of Goethe, “That which moves not forward, goes backward.” If this entrepreneur does not innovate beyond his original design and expects to comfortably ride on his past accomplishments for the remainder of his life, he will not only fail on the free market; he will deserve to fail. The entrepreneur’s prosperity is obtained by supplying goods and services that consumers find useful and beneficial; he should consider it his function to continue seeking ways to satisfy his consumers instead of insisting that they be satisfied with his first innovation or idea.

          Those who lobby for government protection of their existing privileges from non-coercive competition and disruption are, in essence, simply lazy; they seek to bring about by force what they cannot accomplish through honest work.  The most productive and innovative entrepreneurs throughout history have not lobbied for government regulations, though their less efficient competitors have. If the spirit of the former prevails over the latter, we will not only have superior standards of living; we might be able to live in a free society which does not have the tendency to lead to its own restriction.

G. Stolyarov II is a science fiction novelist, independent philosophical essayist, poet, amateur mathematician, composer, contributor to Enter Stage Right, Le Quebecois Libre,  Rebirth of Reason, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Senior Writer for The Liberal Institute, weekly columnist for GrasstopsUSA.com, and Editor-in-Chief of The Rational Argumentator, a magazine championing the principles of reason, rights, and progress. Mr. Stolyarov also publishes his articles on Helium.com and Associated Content to assist the spread of rational ideas. His newest science fiction novel is Eden against the Colossus. His latest non-fiction treatise is A Rational Cosmology. Mr. Stolyarov can be contacted at gennadystolyarovii@yahoo.com.

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